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EXPERTISE AND OPINION ASSIGNMENT ON THE  
COURTS OF APPEALS: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION 
Jonathan Remy Nash* 
Abstract 
This Article examines the role of expertise in judicial opinion 
assignment and offers four contributions: First, this Article develops a 
general theory of opinion assignment on multimember courts. Second, 
this Article uses that theory to predict how expertise might influence 
opinion assignment. Third, because the theory advanced in this Article 
suggests that the courts of appeals are far more likely to witness 
experience-based opinion assignment than is the Supreme Court, this 
Article contributes to an understanding of opinion assignment practices 
in this understudied area. Fourth, this Article identifies two settings in 
which the theory this Article advances should have observable 
implications, and this Article proceeds to test those implications 
empirically. It finds that, in the years following the initial adoption of 
the Sentencing Guidelines, circuit judges who were Sentencing 
Commissioners were more likely to have assigned to them opinions 
raising sentencing issues. It also finds that circuit judges who previously 
served as bankruptcy judges were more likely to have bankruptcy cases 
assigned to them. The Guidelines setting, moreover, allows for a natural 
experiment, in that we can test whether judges who served as 
Commissioners saw disproportionate levels of opinion assignment in 
criminal cases before the Guidelines took effect; it turns out, consistent 
with the theory, that they did not.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Commentators generally accept that, notwithstanding the norm of 
equalizing workload among judges on multimember courts,1 it is at least 
sometimes the case that some judges will tend to write more opinions in 
particular subject matter areas than others. Yet the assignment of 
opinions on the basis of expertise, especially on the federal courts of 
appeals, is undertheorized and understudied. The existing literature is 
lacking in several ways. 
First, the existing literature falls short on offering a clear 
conceptualization of judicial expertise. In particular, it often fails to 
distinguish clearly between, and indeed often conflates, “expertise” and 
“opinion specialization.”2 In fact, the two concepts are quite different:3 
Expertise is the product of training and experience. While expertise 
conceivably might result from the continued writing of judicial opinions 
in an area, it is much more likely to have arisen by virtue of some 
experience the judge enjoyed before joining the court (or extrajudicial 
experience engaged in during judicial service). In short, expertise puts a 
judge at a comparative advantage to draft an opinion because the other 
judges on the court are unlikely to have it.4 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Commentators acknowledge the strength of this norm. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 367–68 
(2002); FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL 
GAME 37 (2000). Sometimes the attempt to equalize workloads goes beyond simple case 
numbers to other attributes, such as case difficulty. See, e.g., JUDITH A. MCKENNA ET AL., FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 18 (2000) 
(“Some courts have their staffs try to distribute cases across panels to equalize judicial 
workloads, either based on staff assessments of case difficulty or according to case type to give 
each panel a range of matters.”); MALTZMAN ET AL., supra, at 22 (noting the importance of case 
difficulty on workloads). Judge Posner explains that “the Supreme Court is more flexible than 
the courts of appeals” with respect to the equal workload norm. RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW 124 (1995).  
 2. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 378–81; David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, 
The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 371, 382 (1999) (studying prestige and influence of judges, and noting that “there is no 
reason why prestige should not derive from expertise” (emphasis added)). 
 3. See Isaac Unah & Christopher Wall, The Effects of Subject-Matter Expertise in the 
U.S. Supreme Court 9–10 (Apr. 1–3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(critiquing this approach). Unah & Wall’s paper is an exception in this regard.  
 4.  In one of the settings examined in this Article, two circuit judges served as 
Commissioners of the United States Sentencing Commission when that Commission drafted the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Although these judges served as Commissioners 
contemporaneously while serving as circuit judges, their understanding of the Guidelines was 
something other circuit judges were unlikely to have. In the other setting, several circuit judges 
served as federal bankruptcy judges before being elevated to the circuit. Once again, the 
understanding these judges had of bankruptcy law and litigation was unlikely to be shared by 
other judges on the circuit court.  
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An opinion assignor might assign opinions in a subject area to 
someone not because the assignee has any expertise, but because he 
enjoys working in that subject area.5 Conversely, a judge might find 
himself the recipient of numerous opinion assignments in an area if it is 
an opinion area that no judge on the court likes6 or if the assignor does 
not like him.7 Political scientists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth 
suggest that “[t]o characterize such justices as specialists seems a 
misnomer.”8 However, they do not explain how to identify issue 
specialization when it does occur. Further, their tests for specialization 
focus, nonetheless, on the frequency with which Justices author 
opinions in particular areas.9  
Like Segal and Spaeth, many other commentators also test for issue 
specialization simply by looking at the frequency with which a judge 
writes opinions in particular areas.10 Even stranger than this is the 
approach taken by Professors Forrest Maltzman, James Spriggs, and 
Paul Wahlbeck: While they hypothesize that a judge’s expertise may 
lead to greater opinion assignment in that area,11 curiously, they 
measure “expertise” by reference to the number of cases in which a 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Issue Specialization in Majority Opinion 
Assignment on the Burger Court, 39 W. POL. Q. 520, 520 (1986).  
 6. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, Of Crud and Dogs: An Updated Collection of Quotations in 
Support of the Proposition that the Supreme Court Does Not Devote the Greatest Care and 
Attention to Our Exciting Area of the Law; or Something the Tax Notes Editors Might Use to 
Fill Up a Little Space in That Odd Week when Calvin Johnson Has Nothing to Print, 58 TAX 
NOTES 1257 (1993). 
 7. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 378 (“Given the norm of equal 
distribution and assigners’ policy preferences, it makes perfect sense to assign unattractive cases 
to one’s ideological opponents.”); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: 
INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 190 (1979) (noting that Justice Blackmun “felt that he had 
suffered” under Chief Justice Burger’s reign, in part by virtue of having received “more than his 
share of tax . . . cases”).  
 8. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 379. 
 9. See id. at 379–80; see also JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: 
THE IMPACT OF COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF APPEALS 48–49 (2002) (noting that expertise can arise from prior experience and 
from drafting opinions in an area); Saul Brenner, Issue Specialization as a Variable in Opinion 
Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court, 46 J. POL. 1217, 1218 (1984) (noting that, while “[i]t is 
not unreasonable to assume that a justice” who is assigned a disproportionate number of 
opinions in an area “might have been selected because he possessed special expertise on that 
issue or that the experience of writing numerous opinions facilitates the development of 
expertise,” “the conclusions of this investigation are not dependent upon either of these two 
assumptions”). 
 10. See, e.g., Burton M. Atkins, Opinion Assignments on the United States Courts of 
Appeals: The Question of Issue Specialization, 27 W. POL. Q. 409, 409 (1974); Brenner, supra 
note 9, at 1218; Brenner & Spaeth, supra note 5, at 520; Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the 
Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 519 (2008). 
 11. See MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 38. 
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Justice wrote a dissent or concurrence in a particular area.12 Measures of 
specialization such as these may capture some opinion assignment 
based on actual expertise. It may also be the case, however, that over 
time, opinion specialization begets expertise.13 But a judge well may 
have developed an expertise before ascending to the bench or, as this 
Article will point out, may develop an expertise while serving as a judge 
but while engaging in nonjudicial activities. Measuring specialization 
will capture this, but it will also capture (i) the “early days” of 
specialization that might one day generate expertise, (ii) judges’ 
preference to write opinions in an area bearing no relationship to any 
expertise, and (iii) areas in which judges disfavored by assignors are 
compelled to write opinions.  
A second shortcoming of most of the extant opinion assignment 
literature is that it examines only the Supreme Court. Only three 
commentators have looked at court of appeals opinion assignment 
practices with respect to specialization, let alone expertise.14 The focus 
on the Supreme Court misses the vast bulk of cases handled by the 
courts of appeals that never reach the Court.15  
Third, the limits of the existing research have stunted efforts to 
theorize about the causal mechanisms that might motivate opinion 
assignments to experts in a field. To be sure, commentators have noted 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See id. at 43–44.  
 13. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 379 (“[S]pecialization may facilitate the 
development of judicial expertise . . . .”); Brenner, supra note 9, at 1218 (“It is not unreasonable 
to assume that . . . the experience of writing numerous opinions facilitates the development of 
expertise.”). The extent to which this is the case likely varies with both the accessibility of the 
area of law and also with the judicial structure. Professor Isaac Unah argues that specialized 
courts (such as the Federal Circuit) provide their judges with an opportunity to develop 
expertise:  
[T]hese judges gain substantive expertise over time by serving in a court that 
concentrates its decision making on a small set of statutorily defined policy 
niches. This narrow focus in turn engenders for the judges a kind of task 
repetitiveness and repeated exposure to congruent case stimuli that is absent in 
traditional courts. Because of this defining feature of specialized courts, judges 
are able to learn quickly and to adapt to their tasks by “thinking by doing.” This 
allows specialized court judges to anticipate problems and design solutions 
even before the problems are brought to court. 
Isaac Unah, Specialized Courts of Appeals’ Review of Bureaucratic Actions and the Politics of 
Protectionism, 50 POL. RES. Q. 851, 858 (1997). 
 14. See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM 250–55 (1981) (finding sporadic evidence of specialization on three circuits); Atkins, 
supra note 10, at 409–10 (finding evidence of opinion specialization on the courts of appeals); 
Cheng, supra note 10, at 540, 548 (finding considerable evidence of specialization). 
 15. See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 265 (2006) (noting 
the general problem of deriving too many lessons from studies focused on the Supreme Court). 
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in passing the efficiency benefits that specialization—with expertise—
offers.16 However, they have not endeavored to explain with any 
precision exactly when, and to what extent expertise will influence 
opinion assignment. Professors Jeffrey Lax and Charles Cameron 
laudably elucidate that expertise should factor into the calculus of the 
costs of opinion writing.17 In the end, however, they—like Professor 
Saul Brenner,18 Segal and Spaeth—present expertise as an adjunct to 
ideology, as something that might play a marginal role in choosing an 
assignee among judges already in a majority coalition.19 Part of the 
problem here is the second shortcoming noted above—the almost 
complete failure of scholars to look beyond the Supreme Court. To the 
extent that courts of appeals are more constrained by law and less free 
to act attitudinally,20 perhaps the theories, and hence the findings, 
applicable to the Supreme Court do not extend well to the courts of 
appeals.21  
Fourth, as a result of the general failure to offer a systematic theory 
of the role of expertise in judicial opinion assignment, commentators 
often do not formulate predictive hypotheses or draw useful conclusions 
with regard to expertise. Expertise is unscientifically discovered after 
the fact as an explanation for cherry-picked observations. Dr. Burton 
Atkins, Professor W.J. Howard, Jr., and Professor Edward Cheng 
identify areas of specialization of various circuit judges, but they 
identify them based upon the disproportionate number of opinions the 
judges draft. The perceived expertise is a result of opinion assignments, 
rather than the impetus for opinion assignments.22 For example, only 
after discovering that Judge Wilkins wrote “an overwhelming number” 
of criminal case opinions does Professor Cheng proffer the 
explanation—nowhere previously hypothesized—that Judge Wilkins 
“was chairman of the United States Sentencing Commission.”23 Years 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 10, at 524–25. 
 17. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on 
the US Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 282 (2007).  
 18. See Brenner, supra note 9, at 1221 (“[T]his study has shown that Warren tended to 
select as issue specialists justices who had the same or similar ideological views as himself.”).  
 19. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 372–73, 378–79.  
 20. See Friedman, supra note 15, at 265. 
 21. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 529–30; see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 143–44 
(arguing that Supreme Court Justices may work harder per case than a court of appeals judge). 
 22. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 10, at 541 (noting amorphously that “many of the specific 
instances of specialization make intuitive sense based on the judges’ backgrounds”). 
 23. Id.; see also id. at 542 (noting that expertise “easily explains the three greatest 
instances of specialization” on the D.C. Circuit). Cheng also suggests that Judge Wilkins’s 
experience as a United States Sentencing Commissioner helps to explain the disproportionate 
number of opinions in postconviction challenges that he wrote. See id. at 541. It is unclear why 
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earlier, both Professor Atkins and Professor Howard offered similar 
after-the-fact, experience-based justifications for a small fraction of 
their specialization findings.24  
This Article seeks to fill some of these gaps in the existing literature. 
First, this Article develops a general theory of opinion assignment on 
multimember courts. Second, this Article uses that theory to predict 
how expertise might influence opinion assignment. Third, in elucidating 
this theory, this Article introduces a factor besides efficiency that might 
motivate experience-based opinion assignment: the enhanced reputation 
of the judge and the court on which he or she sits. Fourth, this Article 
identifies settings in which the theory this Article advances should have 
observable implications, and then proceeds to test those implications. 
Fifth, because the theory this Article describes suggests that the courts 
of appeals are far more likely to witness experience-based opinion 
assignment than is the Supreme Court, this Article contributes to 
research on opinion assignment practices in this understudied area.  
This Article tests the theory of expertise-driven opinion assignment 
in two different settings using original datasets. The first setting is the 
assignment of cases under the United States Sentencing Guidelines on 
court of appeals panels that included judges who served as 
Commissioners on the Sentencing Commission that drafted the 
Guidelines: Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, who served as the first Commission 
Chair; and Judge (later Justice) Stephen Breyer of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit who served as a Commissioner.25 
The Sentencing Guidelines provide a felicitous setting in which to study 
opinion assignment. The introduction of the Guidelines in late 1987 
provided an exogenous shock to the federal criminal legal landscape. 
No judges had experience applying the Guidelines. A few judges, 
however, had served on the Sentencing Commission that drafted the 
Guidelines at Congress’s behest. Judge Wilkins served as the original 
Chair of the Commission. He held that position when the original 
                                                                                                                     
this would be so, since (i) virtually all of these would have been challenges to underlying state 
law convictions, and (ii) almost all the claims raised would have been constitutional in nature. 
 24. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 417 (discussing Second Circuit Judge Hays’s 
specialization in labor cases); id. at 418 & n.16 (discussing Fourth Circuit Chief Judge 
Sobeloff’s specialization in racial, criminal due process, and labor relations cases); HOWARD, 
supra note 14, at 253 (“Exploiting his expertise in admiralty, [Fifth Circuit Judge] Brown alone 
wrote 75 percent of the opinions when eligible in marine personal injuries.”). 
 25. Former Commissioner Information, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/
About_the_Commission/About_the_Commissioners/Former_Commissioners.cfm (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2014). 
I refer in the text to “Judge Breyer” rather than “Justice Breyer” when referring to the time 
period of the study. 
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Guidelines were drafted and promulgated, and he remained in the role 
for the first few years of the Guidelines’ applicability, through 1994.26 
Judge Breyer served as Commissioner from 1985 to 1989. For at least 
the first few years of the Guidelines’ applicability, then, Judge Wilkins 
and Judge Breyer had what almost no other judges,27 even fewer other 
appellate judges, and no other judge on the Fourth or First Circuits, 
had—expertise with the Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover, that 
expertise would have had no bearing in terms of cases, and therefore 
opinion assignments, before the advent of the Guidelines. The 
prediction is that their expertise led to Guidelines cases being assigned 
to them at higher rates than normal. The data generally validate this 
prediction.  
The Guidelines setting is also felicitous in that it allows for a 
valuable natural experiment. Expertise with the Guidelines became 
useful only once the Guidelines took effect. But the Guidelines became 
effective while the judges in question were already on the bench. Thus, 
the Guidelines setting provides a rare example of an expertise that, 
because of an exogenous shock, became useful while the judges were 
already members of the judiciary. This allows us to examine opinion 
assignment in criminal cases both before and after the expertise became 
valuable. If the disproportionate opinion assignment observed after the 
Guidelines became effective were an artifact of something other than 
the judges’ expertise—for example, perhaps the judges had an affinity 
for criminal law cases—then we should observe similar 
disproportionate opinion assignment in criminal cases before the 
Guidelines took effect. On the other hand, if expertise is really driving 
the result after the Guidelines became effective, then we should not 
observe disproportionate opinion assignment before the Guidelines took 
effect. In the end, consistent with the expertise theory, the data reviewed 
in this Article reveal no disproportionate opinion assignment before the 
Guidelines became effective. 
The other setting in which this Article tests the theory is the 
assignment of bankruptcy cases on court of appeals panels that included 
judges who previously served as federal bankruptcy judges. Bankruptcy 
cases provide a useful setting in which to study opinion assignment. 
Bankruptcy law is complex and technical, and has not been found to 
invite substantial ideological voting. Moreover, very few circuit judges 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning Lessons 
from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2 n.1 (2008) 
(noting Judge Wilkins’s appointment and tenure).  
 27. One other federal judge was among the initial appointments to the Sentencing 
Commission: George E. MacKinnon, a senior judge of the District of Columbia Circuit, serving 
from 1985 to 1991. See Former Commissioner Information, supra note 25.  
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could offer the expertise one can obtain only from prior service as a 
bankruptcy judge.  
This Article makes four broad contributions through its analysis. 
First, it offers a theory of the role of expertise in opinion assignment. 
Second, it offers empirical evidence in support of aspects of the theory. 
Third, it operates on a nuanced understanding of expertise rather than, 
as other studies have approached the subject, on the extent of past 
opinion writing in an area. Fourth, it offers empirical evidence, in two 
settings, of expertise-based opinion assignment.  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I offers a utility-based model 
of opinion assignment. Part II then relies upon that model to derive an 
understanding of how expertise might influence opinion assignment. 
Part III describes the two settings in which this Article looks for 
observed implications of that theory. It looks at the assignment of 
federal criminal appeals and Sentencing Guidelines appeals to circuit 
judges who worked as Commissioners on the Sentencing Commission 
that drafted the Guidelines. It also looks at the assignment of 
bankruptcy appeals to circuit judges with prior experience as federal 
bankruptcy judges. Part IV describes the empirical data that this Article 
gathered and the analysis that this Article undertakes to test the theory 
advanced in Part I. Part V discusses the results and suggests some 
implications.  
I.  A UTILITY-BASED MODEL OF OPINION ASSIGNMENT 
This Part offers a utility-based model of opinion assignment (a more 
formal model appears in Appendix A) and begins by considering courts 
in general, with no restriction on the type of case before the court. This 
Part highlights three factors—the time it takes to draft an opinion, the 
legal value of the opinion, and the ideological value of the opinion—
that assigning judges are likely to consider in making opinion 
assignments. This Article then refines the model by considering settings 
involving particular types of courts hearing particular types of cases 
where the last factor, ideology, is less likely to play a role.  
This Article assumes that, in every case, court rules allocate to a 
judge on the panel hearing the case28 the power to assign to one 
member29 of the majority coalition for disposition of the case 
                                                                                                                     
 28. This is almost always, but not universally, the case. See infra note 86 and 
accompanying text (noting one source that asserts that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit at one point employed a random method for opinion assignments, and another that 
asserts that some assigning judges rely at least in part on random distribution).  
 29. It is possible that multiple judges will share opinion-writing responsibility. E.g., 
Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669 & n.* (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (noting that, while the 
opinion was filed “PER CURIAM,” “Judge Williams wrote Parts I.B–C and II.B; Judge Sentelle 
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(including, possibly, the judge with the assignment power) 
responsibility to draft the opinion in the case.30 The only assumed 
restriction on assigning opinions to judges is the expectation that each 
judge will draft roughly the same number of opinions.31  
An assigning judge will select an assignee judge with an eye to the 
utility that the opinion drafted by that judge will provide. An opinion 
will vary (depending on which judge authored it) in the costs and 
benefits it offers in terms of (i) the effort it takes the authoring judge to 
prepare the opinion (“opinion effort”), (ii) legal legitimacy and 
reputation (“legal value”), and (iii) ideological legitimacy and 
reputation (“ideological value”). Assigning judges will estimate their 
utility from some combination of these factors and also from the 
reaction of the assigning judges’ colleagues (including the assignee32) to 
the choice of assignee. Each assigning judge presumably weights the 
factors differently.  
One would expect assigning judges—and indeed all judges on the 
court—to have homogenous views on two of the factors: opinion effort 
and legal value. Whether because the court’s interest and the judges’ 
                                                                                                                     
wrote Parts I.A, II.A, II.C, and III.A; Judge Rogers wrote Parts III.B and IV”). Moreover, even 
if one judge bears primary responsibility for an opinion, other judges who have heard the case 
(and perhaps even other judges on the court who have not heard the case) may have input into 
the opinion. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for 
Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 124 (2003). Still, the simplifying assumption of a 
single author is justified insofar as in most cases a single judge will have primary opinion-
writing responsibility, and that judge will contribute far more work than any other judges to the 
final majority opinion. 
 30. This assumption places the assignment of opinion-drafting responsibility squarely 
within the court’s policy, rather than purely dispositional, function. See Charles M. Cameron & 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts (3): Adjudication Equilibria 5–6 (N.Y. Univ. 
Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-39, 2009) (distinguishing between a 
court’s dispositional and its policy preferences and functions). Recent scholarship confirms the 
importance of policy outcomes to judges and courts. See Deborah Beim et al., Policy and 
Disposition Coalitions on the Supreme Court of the United States 1 (Oct. 23, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=16 
41542.  
 31. This is a simplifying assumption. The norm of parity may sometimes call for rough 
equality of workload, not precise numbers of opinions. Thus, for example, one judge might 
receive fewer opinion assignments than another judge if the cases for which the first judge 
receives assignments are more complicated than those for which the second judge receives 
assignments. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 9, at 72 (explaining the practice on the Ninth Circuit 
of weighting cases by number of issues raised and then assigning fewer cases with more issues 
to panels). This Article assumes that either the norm calls for rough equality in numbers of 
assignments, or more or less equally, that in the long run numbers of cases represent a rough 
proxy for workload.  
 32. A judge could be pleased with receiving the opinion assignment in the case, or she 
might prefer if another judge had been assigned the task. See supra text accompanying notes 5–
6.  
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interests align with the general interest of the court, or even if only out 
of their fiduciary responsibilities, one would expect assigning judges to 
prefer, all else equal, to minimize the depletion of resources imposed by  
the time and effort it takes to prepare the opinion.33  
For similar reasons, one would expect assigning judges—and judges 
on the court in general—to seek, all else equal, to maximize legal value 
benefits.34 These benefits offer the judges the opportunity to establish, 
or build upon, the perception—among other judges, the legal 
community, the other branches of government, and the public-at-
large—that the court is worthy of the powers vested in it and that it 
makes just, law-based decisions.35 They also may enhance the court’s 
and the judges’ reputation for legal quality.36 Legal reputation benefits 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 5–6 (recognizing the pressures that time constraints 
impose on courts of appeals). The idea that courts have limited resources is consistent with the 
notion that courts have external limitations on resources. See Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley, 
Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649, 654 n.15 (2000) (discussing judicial auditing costs, 
and noting that at the least they constitute opportunity costs to the reviewing court); Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a 
Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1610 (1995) (discussing the assumption of resource 
constraint on courts). But the idea that courts have limited resources may also be consistent with 
the notion that judges simply choose to limit their input in order to maximize their own leisure. 
See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 11, 20–21 (1993). 
 34. While one can conceive of an opinion that affirmatively detracts from legal 
legitimacy—say, if the opinion stated bluntly that ideological ends justified an outcome 
notwithstanding legal precedent—this Article assumes that norms and institutional constraints 
governing judicial behavior virtually eliminate such circumstances. See Kornhauser, supra note 
33, at 1606 (taking as a baseline assumption in developing the economic theory of stare decisis 
that “the ‘judicial team’ seeks to maximize the expected number of ‘correct’ answers subject to 
its resource constraint”); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 
746–47 (1982) (discussing how judges belong to an “interpretive community” that subscribes to 
the rule of law). 
 35. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in 
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1055–56 (1995) 
(explaining that self-respect and the respect of others are important motivating stimuli for judges 
and “[j]udges generally gain respect from a craft orientation” that “preserves consistency and 
predictability in the law”); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the 
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1729–32, 1747–50 (1997) (positing, and finding empirical 
evidence, that circuit judges are less likely to vote ideologically in statutory administrative cases 
than procedural ones, whether because Supreme Court review of the former type of case is more 
likely or because the legal standards for procedural challenges are more malleable than for 
statutory challenges); Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial 
Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 973 (2009) (noting that it is well established that “the Court 
has an incentive to protect its institutional legitimacy by avoiding institutional confrontations 
and acts on that incentive”). For discussion of legitimacy in the context of expertise, see infra 
Subsection II.A.2.  
 36. See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 
107, 129–30 (1983) (explaining that judges seek prestige from lawyers and litigants who appear 
 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/3
2014] EXPERTISE AND OPINION ASSIGNMENT ON THE COURTS OF APPEALS 1611 
 
may be especially useful if a court seeks to have other courts assess its 
own legal abilities more favorably.  
Assigning judges—and judges generally—are likely to have far 
more heterogeneous views on ideological value. Whether a judge 
derives benefit or suffers cost from having a choice of assignee depends 
upon whether the judge’s and assignee’s ideologies align.37  
In sum, if two of the relevant factors—opinion effort and legal 
value—dominate, then one would expect the choice of assignee to 
remain fairly constant across assignor judges. The next two Sections 
identify particular types of cases, and then courts, for which this is 
likely to be the case.  
A.  Opinion Assignment and Case Type 
Consider two broad categories of cases: cases in ideologically 
charged subject-matter areas that raise politically salient issues,38 and 
cases in areas—often areas governed by complex codes39—that are 
largely lacking in ideological controversy that do not raise salient 
issues.40 (This Article refers to the latter, if somewhat imprecisely, as 
                                                                                                                     
before them); cf. POSNER, supra note 1, at 141 (noting that, in general, a “more talented judge is 
more likely to obtain a greater reputation”). For discussion of reputation in the context of 
expertise, see infra Subsection II.A.3.  
 37. Assuming there is alignment, a judge might appreciate the opportunity to ensconce an 
ideologically satisfactory holding in a case. Cf. Revesz, supra note 35, at 1747–50 (finding 
empirical evidence of ideological voting on the D.C. Circuit in certain types of cases). If enough 
judges on the court are of like ideological mind, there might be seen a benefit in establishing a 
general ideological reputation for the court.  
 38. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A 
Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 309–10 (2004) (noting that some areas of law 
“by general agreement, are ideologically contested,” while suggesting that other areas involve 
cases that are “apparently nonideological”); cf. Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The Dynamics and 
Determinants of Agenda Change in the Rehnquist Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 251, 252 
(Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (distinguishing between cases of low interest heard by the Court out of 
duty to resolve lower court conflicts, and cases of high interest heard because of subject matter); 
Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court 
Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 171, 183 (1999) (discussing 
Pacelle’s analysis of high- and low-interest cases that are separated by subject matter lines).  
 39. This is not to say that highly technical areas are devoid of ideology (nor to say that 
ideologically charged areas are uncomplicated). See, e.g., Banks Miller & Brett Curry, 
Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 839, 842 (2009) (showing that judicial decision-
making in patent law cases on the Federal Circuit “can be ideological”). The point is only that, 
all else equal, greater legal complexity may tend to mute ideological tendencies.  
 40. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 126, 136 (2013) 
(discussing low-ideology cases); Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Does Ideology Matter 
in Bankruptcy? Voting Behavior on the Courts of Appeals, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919, 919 
(2012) (finding no evidence of ideological voting among circuit judges in bankruptcy cases 
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“nonideological cases.”) Cases in the first category are likely to produce 
values of the various weighting factors that vary greatly across judges. 
Ideologically minded judges will be likely to weight the ideological 
value factor highly—although whether a judge weights these factors 
positively or negatively will depend upon whether the judge is of like, 
or opposite, ideology to the authoring judge. Also, there may be judges 
who tend to be less ideological and tend to believe that cases (even 
ideologically charged ones) ought to be decided in accord with the rule 
of law. These judges may assign comparatively little weight to 
ideological value and instead may give more weight to legal value. 
These differences will, in turn, also feed vastly different utilities for the 
other judges on the court as to the assignee choice. 
In contrast, one can rationally expect the weighting of factors to be 
more uniform across judges with respect to cases that fall within the 
second category—i.e., cases in nonideological areas that do not raise 
salient issues. Here, even ideological judges are likely to weight 
ideological value far less than they do legal value. Indeed, even if 
judges disagree as to the outcome that “the law” dictates or suggests, 
they are likely to agree that the case should be decided in accordance 
with governing law.  
B.  Opinion Assignment and Court Type  
Just as case type may affect the weights judges assign to the various 
factors, court type may have a similar effect. Let us consider two types 
of courts. One is a court that understands its mission as, and devotes 
considerable resources to, correcting errors made by courts below. The 
other is a court that understands its mission in large part as identifying 
and resolving controversial and divisive issues. These two case types 
have representatives in most U.S. jurisdictions: for example, the federal 
courts of appeals are largely error-correcting courts, while the Supreme 
Court is a paradigmatic agenda-setting court.41 This Section argues that 
several institutional features that typically distinguish error-correcting 
courts from agenda-setting courts make error-correcting courts much 
more likely to be more concerned with legal values and less concerned 
with ideology than agenda-setting courts.  
                                                                                                                     
involving discharges of debt). But see Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Rethinking the 
Principal-Agent Theory of Judging, 99 IOWA L. REV. 331, 347 (2013) [hereinafter Principal-
Agent Theory] (finding evidence of ideological voting by circuit judges in a subset of debt 
dischargeability cases).  
 41. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
517, 517 (2003) (“For correction of errors made in particular cases, we rely largely on the 
federal courts of appeals . . . . For the most part, the Supreme Court will consider for review 
only cases presenting what we call deep splits—questions on which other courts . . . have 
strongly disagreed.”). 
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1.  Whether the Court Selects the Cases It Hears 
An agenda-setting court, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, is more 
likely to select the cases that it wishes to decide. This leaves such a 
court free to focus on cases that raise issues that are most pressing and 
important to society. The odds are that many such cases will be 
ideologically divisive, with error correction being displaced.42  
In contrast, an error-correcting court is usually one that hears cases 
where litigants have a right of appeal. As such, one might expect that 
many of the cases that reach such a court will be more straightforward 
and less ideologically divisive. It is also likely that such a court will 
have a larger number of cases on its docket.  
2.  Whether the Court Hears Most Cases in Panels 
An agenda-setting court is more likely to hear cases en banc (or at 
least in panels that include comparatively larger numbers of the total 
complement of judges).43 This means that opinion assignment is likely 
to vest in the same judges repeatedly. Moreover, insofar as the assigning 
judge will always hail from the majority coalition, the subset of 
assigning judges is likely to be much smaller than it would be on courts 
that hear a substantial number of cases in panels. For example, Segal 
and Spaeth found that the Chief Justice assigned the vast majority of 
cases, with the senior-most Associate Justice assigning a much smaller, 
but still the next largest, chunk after that.44 
In contrast, a court that hears a substantial number of cases in panels 
is more likely to have more of its judges assigning opinions,45 to the 
extent that only a judge on the panel has at least some of that 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See id.; Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging 
Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 272 (2006) 
(arguing that the Court eschews error correction in favor of resolving conflicts and settling 
issues of national importance); see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 8 (noting that cases 
that reach the Supreme Court tend to be ideologically charged and legally indeterminate); cf. id. 
at 168, 181–82 (presenting evidence that courts of appeals generally behave less ideologically 
than does the Supreme Court).  
 43. See Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Appeals Mechanisms, Litigant 
Selection, and the Structure of Judicial Hierarchies, in INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT 173, 178, 191 (James R. Rogers et al. eds., 2006).  
 44. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 361–62; accord Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. 
Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 421, 429 (1996) (finding that Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority, and 
therefore assigned the opinion, in 316 of 398 cases argued during the 1987–1989 Terms of 
Court). 
 45. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 528–30 (noting that the Supreme Court has an “arguably 
more top-down assignment process” than do the federal courts of appeals). 
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authority.46 The rotation of panel membership necessarily dilutes the 
chief judge’s assignment power.47 The fact that some judges who 
sometimes are responsible for assigning opinions are other times on the 
receiving end48 may chasten at least some from overemphasizing 
ideology in opinion assignment. 
3.  Whether the Court Regularly Decides Cases Unanimously  
To the extent that (as described above) an agenda-setting court hears 
more ideologically divisive cases and staffs more judges on typical 
appeals, one would expect the judges to disagree more on the proper 
rule and resolution in each case. Thus, one would expect more 
concurrences and dissents.49 This may mean that ideology may trump 
expertise in selecting the opinion author.  
One would expect more unanimous decisions on error-correcting 
courts. That will mean that ideology is more likely to take a back seat to 
legal considerations in terms of opinion assignment.50 Indeed, the 
collegiality that unanimous decision-making fosters51 may spread 
beyond pure cases of error correction to more inherently ideological 
cases.  
4.  How the Court’s Chief Judge Is Selected 
Another institutional feature that varies with whether a court is 
predominantly error correcting or agenda setting—and that affects the 
likely weighting of legal value—is the method of selection of the chief 
judge of the court (to the extent that the chief judge handles opinion 
assignments). Commentators have noted that chief judges may have an 
impact on the ideology of the courts they sit on, but that they also have 
                                                                                                                     
 46. See infra notes 86, 167, and accompanying text (noting instances where judges who 
are not part of the panel enjoy at least technical assignment power).  
 47. See HOWARD, supra note 14, at 247. 
 48. Indeed, some judges may find themselves as senior judge on some panels and junior 
judge on other panels.  
 49. Also, as Judge Posner notes, the costs of dissent rise as the size of the panel shrinks. 
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 123–24.  
 50. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 413 (“Since only minimal overt conflict exists on courts 
of appeals, there is little apparent need to gear opinion assignments toward those political ends.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 51. See Ahmed E. Taha, How Panels Affect Judges: Evidence from United States District 
Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2005) (noting the link between judicial collegiality and 
unanimous opinions). For a discussion of the benefits of collegiality in the judicial decision-
making process, see Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1644–45 (2003) (emphasizing the value of collegiality on 
multimember courts); COHEN, supra note 9, at 12–13, 162–65 (discussing the role, and presence, 
of collegiality on courts of appeals).  
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an institutional role—to ensure that opinion assignments are doled out 
equivalently across members of the court.52 An agenda-setting court is 
more likely to have a chief judge who is politically appointed.53 For 
example, the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
appoints the Chief Justice of the United States, who may in fact be 
junior in service to every other Supreme Court Justice. Once appointed, 
the Chief Justice can be removed only for good cause; his term 
otherwise expires only upon his retirement or death.  
In contrast, a judge becomes chief judge of a federal appellate court 
purely by virtue of having the most years of service on that court and 
being below a certain age; such positions, moreover, are time limited. 
One would expect that the more influence ideology has in how a chief 
judge comes to his or her position, the more he or she will take ideology 
seriously in setting the court’s agenda, a consideration which will likely 
extend to the tool of opinion assignment. In contrast, a chief judge who 
ascends to his or her position by virtue of institutional rule will be more 
likely to see his or her charge as less ideological.54 Such a judge is 
accordingly more likely to see error correction as the court’s mission, 
and thus, is more likely to rely on expertise in opinion assignment.55 
Moreover, since a chief judge of a circuit will always have that position 
by virtue of seniority on the court, one would expect that judge to have 
had the chance to develop collegial relationships with many of his or 
her fellow judges, which might also temper ideological-based opinion 
assignments.56 
In sum, when a non-ideological case is pending before an error-
correcting court, an assignor will draw the greatest utility from an 
assignee choice that both minimizes the time necessary to prepare the 
opinion and also maximizes legal value benefits. As the next Part 
explains, expertise-based opinion assignment fits this bill.  
II.  THE UTILITY OF EXPERTISE-BASED OPINION ASSIGNMENT 
The previous Part explained that, at least in the setting of error-
correcting courts hearing nonideological cases, assigning judges will 
assign cases with an eye toward both minimizing the court resources 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See, e.g., MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 37–38. 
 53. See Edwards, supra note 51, at 1677–78 (noting that the judicial appointment process 
drives an emphasis on “ideological commitment” over collegiality concerns). 
 54. See id. at 1678 (noting anecdotally that judges appointed through the ideological 
appointment process tended to feel “committed to the political party that ensured the 
appointment” and then incorporate that ideology into their adjudicatory decisions).  
 55.  See id. at 1678–89.  
 56. See generally id. at 1643–45 (discussing the development and effects of collegiality in 
the context of the federal circuit courts).  
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devoted to drafting the opinion and maximizing the legal benefits that 
the court will ultimately draw from the finished opinion. Section II.A 
elucidates three benefits that expertise-based opinion assignment 
offers—efficiency benefits, legitimacy benefits, and reputation benefits. 
Section II.B refines the analysis by exploring the supply of, and demand 
for, expertise in opinion writing. Finally, Section II.C explains, in light 
of the first two Sections, how courts of appeals deciding cases that raise 
more technical than ideologically divisive issues are a prime location in 
which to find expertise-based opinion assignment.  
A.  The Benefits of Expertise-Based Opinion Assignment 
In this section, I survey three types of benefits to which expertise-
based opinion assignment will typically give rise: efficiency benefits, 
legitimacy benefits, and reputational benefits. 
1.  Efficiency Benefits 
Efficiency benefits may arise with respect to both the court’s current 
docket and its prospective docket. First, a judge with expertise in an 
area can presumably write an opinion with less effort than a colleague 
who lacks that expertise. Opinion specialization thus saves the court 
(and the judges) effort in dispensing with its current docket.57  
Second, the rule of precedent may empower courts to deploy expert 
judges to reduce their docket going forward. A judge with expertise 
may, more readily than a nonexpert judge, decisively dispose of an 
issue.58 For example, the judge may feel more comfortable 
announcing—and her copanelists may feel more comfortable allowing 
her to announce—a more sweeping rule. Decisive opinions may allow 
future panels of the court to more efficiently address other cases that 
raise similar issues. Indeed, a decisive opinion may even discourage 
future litigants from raising an issue, thus reducing the court’s future 
docket.59 An expert judge might expend the same effort as a judge 
                                                                                                                     
 57. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 39 (1964) (noting that the 
logic behind specialization is predicated on notions of economy); Atkins, supra note 10, at 413 
(“[A] system of task specialization would be in conformity with the trend set by any 
organization beset by increasing work loads.”); Cheng, supra note 10, at 549 (noting that 
specialization promotes judicial efficiency and therefore may “alleviate some of the excess 
caseload problems facing the federal courts”). But see Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, 
and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 849 (2012) (questioning the scope of the 
efficiency benefits of judicial specialization).  
 58. Cheng, supra note 10, at 549 (noting that opinions written by experts are likely to be 
more accurate, enjoy more legitimacy, and be more efficient).  
 59. I do not mean to say that such outcomes are always, or even ever normatively 
desirable, only that an efficiency benefit might obtain. The efficiency benefit might actually 
exact a cost on the court’s legitimacy. As Brenner and Spaeth have argued:  
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without expertise, and yield an opinion that resolves more legal 
questions, thus reducing the effort needed to resolve cases in the future.  
2.  Legitimacy Benefits 
Legitimacy benefits offer a court the opportunity to establish, or 
build upon, the perception—among other judges, the legal community, 
the other branches of government, and the public-at-large—that it is 
worthy of the powers vested in it and that it makes just, law-based 
decisions.60 Having an expert judge draft opinions in his or her area of 
expertise will tend to increase61 the court’s legitimacy and the 
legitimacy of its decisions.62 
                                                                                                                     
[T]he Court’s specialist in a given issue area might too readily influence the 
non-specialists. As a consequence, the decision handed down by the Court and 
the majority opinion which justifies the doctrine might not reflect the 
considered judgment of all members of the majority, but rather, the judgment of 
the Court’s specialist. 
Brenner & Spaeth, supra note 5, at 520. The legitimacy cost might outweigh the efficiency 
benefit. Still, a court might opt for expertise-based opinion assignment based on its own 
(possibly incorrect) balancing of the benefits and costs. 
 60. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
 61. Opinion assignment based on expertise also might reduce a court’s legitimacy. A 
court’s legitimacy is impaired when it is not seen as adhering to established judicial norms. See, 
e.g., Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More 
Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1198–99 (2008). While it was not always the case, see 
generally J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court 
of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1044–65 (2000), discussing “panel packing” by the Fifth 
Circuit in the late 1950s and early 1960s in civil rights cases, it is today the norm (at least in 
theory) to assemble random panels of judges and to assign cases to panels randomly, see infra 
note 67. By analogy, one can argue that assignment of opinions to particular judges based upon 
expertise is normatively undesirable. See, e.g., Chi. Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 706 (1994) 
(“The main problem with having the presiding judge assign cases arises from the perception that 
certain judges have areas of expertise. A judge with a strong interest in a subject matter will 
assign to himself, or be assigned, a disproportionate number of cases in that area.”); 5TH CIR. 
I.O.P. 34 (“Judges do not specialize. Assignments are made to equalize the workload of the 
entire session.”); 11TH CIR. I.O.P. 34(15) (same).  
Still, the norm against such assignments in the context of judicial expertise may be weaker 
than the norm in favor of random assignment of cases to judges: The unenacted Blind Justice 
Act of 1999, S. 1484, 106th Cong. § 2, which would have statutorily mandated random 
assignment of circuit judges to panels (and district judges to cases), included a specific 
exception allowing for assignment of judges to cases based on judicial expertise.  
 62. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 410 (noting that specializing case assignments develops 
“expertise that may enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the decisions”). One way that 
expertise may enhance legitimacy is by limiting the number of reversals that a court incurs. See 
Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model 
of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 102 (2000) (“Frequent 
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3.  Reputation Benefits 
Commentators have not, to date, focused upon reputation benefits 
that courts may garner from having experts write opinions in their areas 
of expertise. Reputation benefits offer a court the chance to establish 
itself as a leader in a particular area of law.63 Even to the extent that the 
court is not directly competing with other courts for litigants,64 a court 
that has an expert judge elucidating an area of law may find itself relied 
upon by other courts that face similar issues. 65 In this way, the court’s 
influence may grow.66 
                                                                                                                     
reversals bring the derision of colleagues and a decline in professional status.”). It has been said 
that “[w]hen the Supreme Court has little interest in a technically demanding area (such as 
admiralty or patent law), . . . the Court will largely or entirely abandon the area.” Id. at 108. The 
intuition is that, in these types of areas, the Supreme Court—which is more politically oriented 
than its subordinates—is more likely to believe that there is an objectively “correct” answer. See 
Nash, supra note 29, at 112–13 n.130 (2003) (noting debate over whether the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem is properly applicable in the context of appellate court panels based on whether or not 
there exist “right” answers to legal questions).  
Even granting that the Supreme Court focuses on ideologically charged areas and cases, 
however, the Court still may not let lower court cases stand when it believes that the lower court 
has not actually reached that correct answer. See Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 43, at 178–
79; see also C. Scott Hemphill, Deciding Who Decides Intellectual Property Appeals, 19 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 379, 381 (2010) (“In recent years, the Court has become an increasingly aggressive 
reviewer of Federal Circuit patent lawmaking.”). But see Shapiro, supra note 42, at 278 (“Along 
with the trend towards an almost exclusively discretionary docket came the Court’s attempt to 
define its role not as the court of last resort for unhappy litigants, but as a forum to resolve 
issues of broader concern.”).  
In this sense, expert opinion authorship may convince the Court that the court below 
reached the correct conclusion. This might be because the expert’s opinion is convincing, or 
because the Court is more likely to defer to the reasoning of an expert. Thus, the likelihood of 
reversal may be reduced, and as a corollary, the legitimacy of the lower court may be enhanced. 
Note that this reasoning should not be read to discount the possibility that legitimacy benefits 
might inhere even when an area of law is politicized. To the contrary, as this Article discusses 
below, an expert might be able to draw legitimacy even while deciding a case ideologically by 
infusing the opinion with expert language that cloaks the ideology. See infra note 71 and 
accompanying text.  
 63. A judge’s expertise might enable him or her to develop a reputation in an area at a 
comparative cost advantage to judges without that expertise. See, e.g., Klein & Morrisroe, supra 
note 2, at 381–82 (“While we have no reason to doubt that Judge Wilkins is highly regarded by 
his colleagues, it is clear that his leading score [for citation of his opinions] is attributable 
largely to his service as chair of the United States Sentencing Commission.”).  
 64. See Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 
94 GEO. L.J. 1141 (2006). 
 65. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 549 (noting that opinions written by judges with 
expertise—especially in highly specialized areas of law—enjoy greater legitimacy and, in turn, 
deference from others). 
 66. It is debatable whether circuits have reputations beyond the reputations of the 
individual judges. Compare DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS 91–93 (2002) (finding little evidence of circuit reputations in interviews with circuit 
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B.  The Likelihood of Expertise-Based Opinion Assignment 
Two broad considerations will affect the likelihood of expertise-
based opinion assignment. The first is the supply of expertise for 
opinion-writing purposes—i.e., the frequency with which cases arise in 
which an expert might realistically be assigned to draft the opinions. 
The second is the demand for expertise-based opinion assignment—i.e., 
the extent to which a court is motivated in fact to assign an expert to 
draft an opinion when it is able.  
1.  Supply of Expertise 
Several factors determine a court’s available supply of judges with 
relevant expertise to draft opinions. 
a.  Frequency with Which the Area of Law Arises on the Court’s 
Docket 
The frequency with which cases in an area of law come before the 
court affects the frequency with which an expert in the area might be 
assigned to draft court opinions to the extent that not all judges on the 
court hear all cases. If cases in an area of law appear sporadically on the 
court’s docket, then it may be that the expert judge is rarely (or never) 
on the panel when an issue in that area arises.67  
b.  The Position on the Court of the Judge with Expertise 
Consider next the position on the court of the judge with expertise. If 
the judge is the chief judge of the court, he may be limited in his 
                                                                                                                     
judges), with Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1331, 1339–50 (2005) (canvassing literature to 
identify various ways to measure a circuit’s reputation). I do not purport to resolve this debate 
here. If a judge develops a reputation as an expert in an area of law, the circuit, along with the 
judge, will reap the benefit of that expertise. The circuit will receive an additional benefit to the 
extent that, as a consequence, its influence grows even through opinions authored by other 
judges and in areas beyond the heart of the judge’s expertise.  
 67. Though it is not required by law, courts today generally assign judges to panels, and 
panels to cases, randomly. COHEN, supra note 9, at 72; see MCKENNA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., supra note 1, at 101 (With minor exceptions, “assignment of cases to panels is random 
and is separate from the assignment of judges to panels. The independent assignment of cases to 
panels is to ensure that particular judges do not receive—or appear to receive—a 
disproportionate share of particular case types”); Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1606 n.26 (2000); Brown & Lee, supra note 61, at 1041. 
Matthew Hall has questioned empirically the random assignment of cases to panels. See 
Matthew Hall, Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 574, 575 (2010). The Article tests, and 
generally confirms, random assignment on the data this Article collected. See infra Subsection 
IV.A.3.  
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freedom to take full advantage of that expertise. The chief judge may be 
reluctant to assign himself a disproportionate share of a particular type 
of case for fear of the institutional message it might send.68 The chief 
judge also may feel constrained by the requirement of equal 
distributions not to self-assign excessively.69  
The expertise of a senior circuit judge may also not be fully 
exploited. Many circuit judges who have taken senior status hear far 
fewer cases than their active colleagues. Their relative unavailability 
may force other judges to confront major issues in the senior circuit 
judge’s field of expertise.70 
2.  Demand for Expertise-Based Opinion Assignment 
Similar to the supply of expertise, several factors affect the extent to 
which a court will benefit from, and therefore ‘demand’, expertise-
based opinion assignment.  
a.  Area of Law in Which the Expertise Lies 
First, the more difficult the expertise is to replicate, the more 
valuable it will be. Thus, all else equal, expertise in a more technically 
complicated area will be more valuable.71 Along similar lines, expertise 
                                                                                                                     
 68. MALTZMAN ET. AL., supra note 1, at 37.  
 69. See id. at 37–38. For additional factors assigning judges may consider when opting 
not to self-assign, see Lax & Cameron, supra note 17, at 293 (offering more instrumental 
reasons for a Chief Justice not to self-assign). 
 70. The same is likely to be true of district judges, and other judges from other courts who 
sit “by designation” on court of appeals panels from time to time. In addition, it is less likely 
that expert opinions by a judge from one court sitting by designation on another court would 
inure to the general benefit of the second court.  
 71. See, e.g., DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 135 (1988) (noting that 
Judge David Dyer possessed “expertise in two high specialized areas of law, admiralty and 
aviation,” and as a result of this expertise, Judge Dyer “continued to respond to the court’s 
request to fashion opinions on tedious, complex admiralty cases” long after he graduated to 
senior judge); Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision Making of Specialized Courts and 
General Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decisions, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136 (2005) (“Tax cases 
often involve technically complex issues calling for significant judicial discretion in 
interpretation. The evaluation of such claims usually demands expertise in the policy area.”); 
Brenner & Spaeth, supra note 5, at 520 (“Some areas of the law are particularly complex (e.g., 
tax law) and it is more efficient to assign those areas to specialists.”).  
It may be that the technical nature of an area of law in fact invites those who are versed in 
the area to couch ideology in seemingly legalistic reasoning:  
[B]ecause tax policy is complex, judges of general jurisdiction courts need to 
rely more on litigants, lawyers, the IRS, and other courts for the meaning and 
proper construction of the Internal Revenue Code; this reliance on outside 
interpretation will restrict the use of ideology in the rulings by the district court 
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in a relatively new area of law—such as a statutory or regulatory 
scheme—will also be valuable, at least in the short-term.72 On the other 
hand, when any judge can easily obtain expertise in an area of law, 
expertise in that area is of less value. In particular, expertise that can 
readily be gained simply by hearing cases in an area is of less value than 
deeper expertise that cannot be thus obtained.73 
Second, the more uncommon expertise in that area of law is, the 
more valuable is a particular judge’s expertise. Thus, an individual 
judge’s expertise in an area is more important the less it is shared by 
other judges on the court.74 Put another way, the more judges who share 
an expertise, the less important a role expertise will play in assigning 
opinions among judges.  
  
                                                                                                                     
judges. Tax court judges’ expertise, and the concomitant lack of reliance on 
others, means that the tax court judges have greater freedom to use their 
ideology in their rulings. 
Howard, supra, at 141; cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to 
Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1745 (2003) (noting that state high 
courts may have a particularly good opportunity to decide cases with bias against out-of-state 
residents by embedding that bias in obscure statements of state law). To whatever extent that 
may be the case, that is not inconsistent with my point: A court may assign cases in a field to 
Judge X, an expert in that field, on the assumption that Judge X decides those cases based on her 
expertise, when in fact Judge X’s opinions and decisions are ideologically driven. Still, the fact 
remains that the court’s decision to assign the cases to Judge X is based upon considerations of 
expertise, and Judge X’s expertise enables her to hide her ideology such that the court views 
those opinions and decisions to be expertly (and not ideologically) decided even after the fact.  
 72. See KLEIN, supra note 66, at 75–78 (finding that judicial rules announced by 
experts—although with the term defined by reference to prior opinion writing in the area—fared 
better in subsequent cases than did opinions announced by nonexperts). 
 73. It seems dubious that, simply from hearing cases in an area, one can gain expertise as 
deep as one would get from practicing in the area as a lawyer or participating in drafting the law 
as a legislator or regulator. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 205 (2008) (“No judge 
of [a non-specialty] court can be an expert in more than a small fraction of the fields of law that 
generate the appeals that he must decide, or can devote enough time to an individual case to 
make himself, if only for the moment (knowledge obtained by cramming is quickly forgotten), 
an expert in the field out of which the case arises.”). But see COHEN, supra note 9, at 49 
(suggesting that a judge can gain expertise during their tenure by learning the law for each case 
over which they preside). To the extent that one can gain some expertise that way, that expertise 
reduces, at least somewhat, the value of the expert judge.  
 74. Note the implication for whether the court is a generalist or specialist court. To be 
sure, one of the benefits of having a court specialize in a particular area of law is to have judges 
who are experts in, or become experts in, that area of law. Howard, supra note 71, at 136 
(“Expertise is a significant benefit of a specialized court.”). Still, the value of each judge’s 
expertise is reduced by virtue of the substitutability of judges.  
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b.  Frequency with Which the Area of Law Arises on the Court’s 
Docket 
The frequency with which the area of law (in which a judge has 
expertise) arises on the court’s dockets implicates both the frequency 
with which the court has the opportunity to assign opinions in the area 
to an expert (as discussed above), and also the demand for that expert to 
draft opinions in the area. There is reason to suspect that expertise-
based assignment does not always increase as an area in which a judge 
has expertise arises more frequently on the court’s docket. Given the 
random assignment of cases to judges on appeals courts, an expert 
might never have the opportunity to hear a case in the area of his or her 
expertise if the area of law arises with extreme infrequency. Thus, if an 
area of law makes infrequent appearances in court cases, expertise in 
that area will not provide much in the way of efficiency benefits, let 
alone legitimacy or reputation benefits.  
On the other hand, if an area of law arises with great frequency, then 
(i) it is more likely that other judges will have the opportunity to 
develop their own expertise in the area, and, more importantly (ii) it is 
more likely that nonexpert judges may often have to resolve issues 
before the expert judge has an opportunity to resolve them. More 
generally, the more heterogeneous a court’s docket, the greater the 
demand for an individual judge’s expertise. Opinion specialization 
matters more where one judge’s expertise in an area frees other judges 
from having to decide, at least in the first instance, challenging issues in 
that area.75 If the court specializes in cases in that area, the efficiency 
benefits from opinion specialization tend to dissipate. It is also more 
likely that more judges on a court that specialize in a particular area will 
possess similar expertise.76  
A second point is whether the area in which a judge’s expertise lies 
arises mostly in conjunction with other issues from other areas of law, 
or whether it more often appears as the central focus of the cases. An 
expertise in an area that arises frequently but in conjunction with issues 
                                                                                                                     
 75. See URPHY, supra note 57, at 39.  
 76. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Professor Daniel Meador argues against 
classifying courts as “generalist” or “specialist” based upon the court’s defined subject matter 
jurisdiction. Instead, he suggests that one must examine the scope of cases that the court actually 
is called upon to decide. See Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying 
the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 611–15 (1989). The 
validity of this point notwithstanding, it still seems that judges are usually appointed to courts 
that are traditionally seen as specialist (not in the sense that Meador means) based upon their 
special expertise. And, in contrast, judges are not usually appointed to courts that are seen as 
generalist based upon special expertise. Indeed, it seems that prior expertise is hardly a 
prerequisite for appointment to the regional courts of appeals.  
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from other areas of law is less valuable than expertise that can be 
deployed frequently to resolve entire cases. For example, a judge who 
was involved in redrafting the Federal Rules of Evidence might find that 
demand for that expertise is dispersed over cases that arise under a large 
number of distinct areas of law, many of which may be quite unfamiliar 
to the judge.  
c.  Status of the Court Within the Broader Judiciary 
The extent to which the court is accepted within the broader 
judiciary will affect the extent of the court’s demand for legitimacy 
benefits. These benefits are less important the more a court is already 
accepted and respected. As an example, non-Article III judges and 
courts are typically thought to be in greater need of legitimization than 
are their Article III counterparts.77 It is probably also the case that older, 
more established courts need less legitimization than comparatively 
newer courts.78  
d.  Frequency with Which the Area of Law Arises on Other Courts 
The frequency with which the area of law comes before other courts 
affects the demand for expertise by determining the opportunity for 
establishing a reputation. A judge on the Fourth Circuit may have an 
expertise in pneumoconiosis (“black lung” condition afflicting coal 
miners), but it is likely that the extent of any inter-court benefit would 
extend in large measure only to the Sixth Circuit, since the vast bulk of 
those cases arise in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 77. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 118; Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 77 (1997) (“The federal judges opposed 
the creation of more independent bankruptcy courts, because (1) they would lose their 
appointment power over bankruptcy judges, and thus one of their main patronage opportunities, 
and (2) their status would be diluted through the vast increase in the number of federal judicial 
positions.”); Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal 
District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. 
L.J. 607, 682–84 (2002) (arguing in favor of Article III judges self-consciously blurring the line 
between Article III and non-Article III judges and tribunals in the face of the reality that non-
Article III adjudication is becoming more and more critical, but also noting the hurdles to the 
distinction actually disappearing). 
 78. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal 
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 823 (2008) (noting that “[t]he first-
generation jurists [on the Federal Circuit] were right to establish the bona fides of the court and 
avoid attention” and arguing that “the court is now fully established,” so that “there is no longer 
a need for the court to take defensive positions or to maintain a low profile;” indeed, “[n]ow that 
the court is mature, it is time to press its position as a tribunal with special expertise and to 
fulfill its role as the near-final authority in patent matters”). 
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e.  Whether the Court Has Coequal Sister Courts 
A final factor that affects the demand for a judge’s expertise is 
whether the court has coequal sister courts. The more courts of equal 
level in the hierarchy, the more valuable we might expect a judge’s 
expertise to be. The more courts there are at the same level, the more 
reputation offers a court the means to differentiate itself from its sister 
courts.  
This may play out in two ways. First, some courts face actual 
competition for litigants.79 It may be possible that a court with an expert 
judge can attract litigants by having that judge announce rules and 
decide cases in her area of expertise.  
Second, even if courts do not actually compete for litigants—where, 
for example, the choice of which court of appeals hears an appeal is 
based not upon the choice of litigants but upon geography—the 
existence of sister courts who are hearing similar issues may still create 
an opportunity for a court to establish itself as an expert in a particular 
area to which other courts will cite. Thus, for example, the Eighth 
Circuit may look to the expert opinions of Judge Posner on the Seventh 
Circuit in deciding antitrust cases.80 It is also possible that, to the extent 
that the Eighth Circuit has yet to resolve an issue that Judge Posner on 
the Seventh Circuit has addressed, a district court in the Eighth Circuit 
may rely upon decisions of the Seventh Circuit in reaching its decision. 
Note, moreover, that the district court’s reliance upon the Seventh 
Circuit’s decisions may in turn influence the Eighth Circuit when it 
eventually faces the issue. In this way, a court that has a judge who is an 
expert in a field becomes an asset that bolsters that court’s reputation. 
C.  Likely Settings of Expertise-Based Opinion Assignment 
The last section identified two general factors that may predict the 
likelihood of expertise-based opinion assignment: the nature of the 
court, and the type of subject matter. With respect to court type, 
expertise-based opinion assignment should be more likely on a court 
that (i) hears various types of cases, (ii) hears cases in relatively small 
panels, (iii) is predominantly an error-correcting court, (iv) has a chief 
judge who serves in that role not by virtue of ideology, (v) spreads 
responsibility for opinion assignment to various judges, and (vi) has a 
number of sister courts of equal and lesser rank in the judicial hierarchy. 
A moment’s reflection confirms that the regional federal courts of 
                                                                                                                     
 79. See Isaac DiIanni, The Role of Competition in the Market for Adjudication, 18 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 203, 211–12 (2012).  
 80. See KLEIN, supra note 66, at 93–96. 
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appeals meet these criteria.81 Courts of appeals are predominantly error-
correcting courts. The chief judge serves by virtue of a number of 
objective factors, most importantly his or her seniority on the court.82 
Appeals are almost always heard in panels of three judges. The circuit 
courts hear all appeals brought to them, and drafting opinions is a time-
consuming matter for circuit judges.83 The circuit courts’ large 
workload84 makes efficiency benefits very attractive.85  
Though there is variation from circuit to circuit, courts of appeals, to 
some degree, vest opinion assignment authority with the panel’s 
presiding judge.86 The presiding judge on a panel will be either the 
                                                                                                                     
 81. But see Unah & Wall, supra note 3, at 24 (finding evidence that expertise is a 
statistically significant predictor of opinion assignment at the Supreme Court).  
 82. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).  
 83. See, e.g., Letter from Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, at 9 
(Jan. 16, 2004).  
 84. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 9, at 6–8 (noting the precipitous increase in the federal 
courts of appeals).  
 85. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 524–25 (noting that efficiency is a goal most “difficult to 
dismiss” given the burgeoning caseloads).  
 86. See id. at 527 n.35. Some courts empower the presiding judge to assign opinions even 
in cases where he or she is not part of the majority coalition. See id. (noting that several circuits’ 
rules seem to allow this, and noting an email from Judge Richard Posner affirming that “the 
Seventh Circuit allows the presiding judge to assign majority opinions even if he or she is in 
dissent”). The Fourth Circuit vests opinion assignment authority in the chief judge, based upon 
the recommendation of the presiding judge. See 4TH CIR. I.O.P. 36.1. But see infra note 167 
(questioning the extent to which the presiding judge’s recommendation is overridden in 
practice).  
Some courts—perhaps most notably the Ninth Circuit—use a system of shared bench 
memorandum that effectively alters the opinion assignment sequence. Traditionally, circuit 
judges have had their law clerks prepare a bench memorandum for each case that they hear, and 
therefore each member on a panel of three judges will have had his or her clerks prepare a 
separate bench memorandum. Under a shared system, the presiding judges assigns one judge on 
the panel the responsibility of preparing a bench memorandum for the entire panel for each case. 
COHEN, supra note 9, at 94–95 (describing the practice); Harry Pregerson, The Seven Sins of 
Appellate Brief Writing and Other Transgressions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 431, 433 (1986) 
(“Generally, each judge’s staff prepares one or two bench memoranda for each day’s sitting.”); 
Stephen L. Wasby, Clerking for an Appellate Judge: A Close Look, 5 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 
19, 52–53 (2008) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s practice); see also Patricia M. Wald, 19 Tips 
from 19 Years on the Appellate Bench, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 7, 14 (1999) (noting that D.C. 
Circuit panels do not typically share bench memoranda, but that in “monster cases . . . we 
usually divide up the bench memoranda between chambers”). Typically, unless the judge who 
had the responsibility to prepare the memorandum for the panel is not part of the majority 
disposing of the case, that judge will then accede to opinion drafting responsibilities. See 
COHEN, supra note 9, at 73 (“[W]hile the opinion-writing responsibility is separate from the 
responsibility for drafting bench memoranda, judges rarely split those two responsibilities in 
practice.”). In the end, however, this practice still leaves the assigning judge free to consider 
factors like expertise, just like a judge making the initial assignment after oral argument. Cf. id. 
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(i) Circuit Justice, (ii) if the Circuit Justice is not part of the panel, the 
circuit’s chief judge, or (iii) if the chief judge also is not part of the 
panel, the presiding judge87—the active circuit judge with the lengthiest 
service on the court.88 Opinion assignment is thus not restricted to a 
small number of judges on the court.89  
Finally, there are many circuit courts, and many district courts within 
each circuit. There is thus an opportunity for a small number of circuits 
to differentiate themselves by featuring opinions in an area authored by 
experts.  
If the practices of the courts of appeals are logical places in which to 
look for expertise-based opinion assignment, what areas of law might be 
especially good places to look? Broadly speaking, expertise-based 
opinion assignment will be more likely for subject matters that are (i)  
novel or technical, and (ii) that arise with fair frequency both in the 
court on which the expert sits and in other courts. One such area might 
be securities regulation. This is a complex area of law where expertise 
would substantially reduce opinion-preparation time and would also 
enhance the issuing court’s legitimacy and reputation. Indeed, an 
existing study confirms this notion. Professor Margaret Sachs finds that 
Judge Henry Friendly was assigned a vastly disproportionate number of 
                                                                                                                     
(explaining that one judge reports sometimes being asked to identify those cases for which his 
law clerks would be most interested in writing bench memoranda).  
One source indicates that the Sixth Circuit uses a random opinion assignment system:  
In the Sixth Circuit, majority opinions are assigned on a rotating schedule 
rather than by the senior (or chief) judge on the panel. In the event that the 
judge whose turn it is to author the “majority” opinion is not actually in the 
majority, the opinion he writes becomes his individual dissent. 
VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 133 n.3 (2006). Another source 
indicates that some presiding judges assign responsibility for drafting bench memoranda for the 
panel in advance of oral argument—and therefore effectively in most cases end up assigning 
responsibility for opinion drafting as well—randomly. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 73. 
 87. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(b).  
 88. See id. (“[Besides the chief judge, o]ther circuit judges of the court in regular active 
service shall have precedence and preside according to the seniority of their commissions.”). 
Congress enacted this provision to eliminate attempts by senior circuit judges to retain opinion 
assignment authority after assuming senior status. See HOWARD, supra note 14, at 247 n.w.  
 89. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also HOWARD, supra note 14, at 247 
(“[P]anel rotation and seniority diffuse the power to assign.”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 
749 (2008) (“[U]nlike the Supreme Court, which has control over its docket, the assignment 
power itself is not as important to the circuit courts because the courts sit in panels, and there is 
generally a large docket that needs to be shared. Thus, judges are forced to cooperate, and the 
importance of hierarchy is diminished.”). 
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securities regulation opinions during his tenure on the Second Circuit.90 
Professor Sachs attributes this result at least in part to the fact that Judge 
Friendly was one of only two circuit judges who served on a 
(nonjudicial) panel that sought, ultimately without success, to redraft the 
federal securities laws.91 Professor Sachs notes that “his connection 
with the [project] likely enhanced his standing as a securities expert 
among his Second Circuit colleagues,” which “in turn probably 
increased the number of important securities opinions that he was 
assigned to write.”92 Finally, Sachs argues that Judge Friendly’s 
reputation among the federal judiciary was enhanced by virtue of the 
fact that the Second Circuit, which had been the nation’s premiere 
federal commercial court, was beginning a period where it would 
dominate federal appellate court output of securities law opinions.93  
The theory suggests several testable hypotheses. First, one would 
expect to observe heightened assignment of cases to judges with an 
expertise in a relatively nonideological area.  
Hypothesis 1: A circuit judge with expertise in a relatively 
nonideological area will be assigned opinion assignment 
responsibility in a disproportionate share of cases in that 
area. 
Second, one would expect a judge’s expertise to influence opinion 
assignment only at a time when the court actually hears cases that raise 
issues in the area of expertise. If the expertise does not enhance the 
legal reasoning necessary to the resolution of cases, then one would not 
expect it to result in the disproportionate assignment of opinions. 
Hypothesis 2: A circuit judge with expertise in a relatively 
nonideological area will be assigned opinion responsibility 
in a disproportionate share of cases in that area only when 
the expertise is relevant to the decision of cases.  
Third, one would expect expertise to be more valuable, and therefore 
expect to see more expertise-based opinion assignment, in cases that 
raise more, rather than fewer, issues of law in the area in question.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 90. See Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The 
Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777, 809–10 (1997). 
 91. See id. at 794. 
 92. Id. at 795; see also id. at 813 (“Presiding judges probably assigned Judge Friendly a 
disproportionate share of securities opinions for three reasons: he was (1) interested in securities 
regulation; (2) an expert in the subject area; and (3) senior to many of his colleagues at a 
relatively early stage of his judicial career.”). 
 93. See id. at 791–93. 
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Hypothesis 3: A circuit judge with expertise in a relatively 
nonideological area will be assigned responsibility to write 
an even more disproportionate share of opinions in cases 
that raise more issues of law in the area in question. 
Fourth, to the extent that opinion assignment in nonideological cases 
is based more on expertise than on politics, one would expect the 
political leanings of judges to play a comparatively minor role in the 
assignment of opinions.  
Hypothesis 4: A circuit judge with expertise in a relatively 
nonideological area will be assigned a disproportionate 
share of opinions in those cases, regardless of the party of 
the president who appointed the assigning judge.  
Fifth, along similar lines, one would expect expertise to overcome 
years of judicial service in the assignment of opinions in relatively 
nonideological cases.  
Hypothesis 5: A circuit judge with expertise in a relatively 
nonideological area will be assigned a disproportionate 
share of opinions in those cases, even if he or she is not the 
assigning judge, and regardless of whether he or she is the 
middle or junior member of the majority coalition.  
III.  TWO SETTINGS FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES AND BANKRUPTCY 
This Part describes the two settings tested in Part IV for observable 
implications of the theory of expertise-based opinion assignment 
advanced in Parts I and II. The first setting is the assignment of opinions 
in appeals from convictions for federal crimes—particularly those 
implicating the United States Sentencing Guidelines—to circuit judges 
who served as Commissioners on the Sentencing Commission when the 
Guidelines were drafted.94 The second setting is the assignment of 
bankruptcy opinions to circuit judges who previously served as federal 
bankruptcy judges.  
A.  The Sentencing Guidelines and the Commissioners 
This Section first describes the Sentencing Guidelines and explains 
why they present an area of law well suited to expertise-based opinion 
assignment. This Section then offers brief biographies of two men—
William W. Wilkins, Jr., and Stephen G. Breyer—who each served both 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Cf. Unah & Wall, supra note 3, at 16–20 (measuring expertise of Supreme Court 
Justices based upon credentials, experience, and track record).  
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as Commissioners during the Guidelines drafting process and also as 
circuit judges during the early years of the Guidelines’ applicability.  
1.  The Guidelines 
The assignment of opinions under the federal Sentencing Guidelines 
to experts who helped draft the Guidelines is an especially felicitous 
area in which to conduct such an investigation. First, the advent of the 
Guidelines constituted an exogenous shock. Before their effective date, 
the sentencing system in federal court (and, for that matter, in state 
courts) looked entirely different. Second, once the Guidelines took 
effect, Guidelines cases flooded the federal courts. Third, only two 
active circuit judges served on the commission that drafted those 
Guidelines; their expertise was thus very unique.  
Prior to the advent of the Guidelines, the sentencing system in 
federal court looked entirely different. Absent statutory mandates, 
district judges were largely free to impose sentences as they saw fit 
following conviction.95 Frustrated with what it saw as needless 
discontinuity in sentencing, Congress decided to make a fundamental 
change to the system. The Sentencing Reform Act of 198496 (the “Act”) 
established the United States Sentencing Commission (the 
“Commission”). The Commission consists of seven voting members, 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.97 
The Commission was charged with drafting, and later amending, 
sentencing guidelines in accordance with the broad mandate of 
Congress, as expressed in the Act, for use by federal district judges in 
criminal matters.98 The Sentencing Guidelines initially went into effect 
on November 1, 1987.99  
An initial question that dogged the Guidelines was whether 
Congress’s delegation to the Commission ran afoul of constitutional 
separation of powers principles. The Supreme Court answered that 
question in the negative in its 1989 decision in Mistretta v. United 
                                                                                                                     
 95. See Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of 
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 79 n.156 (1995) (noting Congress passed the 
Sentencing Reform Act in part to respond to the “tremendous discretion accorded to district 
judges in the criminal sentencing process”).  
 96. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).  
 97. See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
3, http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2014).  
 98. See id. at 1; Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 
26 (2006).  
 99. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 97, at 2. 
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States.100 Many years later, in 2005, the Court in United States v. 
Booker101 held that the Guidelines had to be interpreted as merely 
advisory, and not binding on district courts, in order to be 
constitutional.102 After Booker, courts of appeals review sentences 
meted out by district courts only for their reasonableness in light of the 
Guidelines.103 During the intervening period, however, the Guidelines 
were mandatorily applied in all federal district courts, with appeals 
lying to the courts of appeals.104  
The Guidelines instituted a bureaucratic scheme that vests far less 
discretion in trial judges.105 Broadly speaking, the Guidelines call for 
the sentencing judge to identify two numerical dimensions for each 
criminal defendant to be sentenced: the offense level and the criminal 
history category.106 The crime for which the defendant has been 
convicted sets the “base offense level.”107 Levels are then added or 
subtracted based upon various factors, such as whether a gun was used 
to effectuate the crime (addition) and whether the defendant accepts 
responsibility for his or her actions (subtraction).108 The criminal history 
category is determined by reference to the prior criminal offenses 
committed by the defendant.109 The Guidelines provide a grid that, 
given various combinations and ranges of offense level and criminal 
history category, produces a sentencing range.110 Under congressional 
statute, a sentencing judge can depart from the sentencing range 
produced by rigid application of the Guidelines if there is an 
“aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
                                                                                                                     
 100. 488 U.S. 361, 380–84 (1989).  
 101. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 102. Id. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., delivering opinion of the Court in part); see also id. at 245 
(Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (finding unconstitutional “the provision 
of the federal sentencing statute that made the Guidelines mandatory”). In two decisions earlier 
in the decade—Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296 (2004)—the Court had held state sentencing schemes unconstitutional to the extent 
that they allowed a trial judge, and not juries, to find facts used to enhance sentences beyond the 
maximum provided by statute. The Booker Court saw the earlier cases as mandating the 
conclusion that binding federal Sentencing Guidelines were similarly unconstitutional. Booker, 
543 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).  
 103. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–62 (discussing the reasonableness standard).  
 104. Id. at 233, 260.  
 105. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 26. 
 106. See id. at 26 (noting the variables included in the judge’s post-conviction sentencing 
calculus).  
 107. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2 introductory cmt. (2013). 
 108. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 27 (noting that base levels can be 
adjusted by adding or subtracting “offense-level points”).  
 109. Id. at 26 n.5. 
 110. Id. at 26.  
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adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the [G]uidelines.”111  
The federal courts of appeals’ application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines provides an excellent setting in which to examine expertise-
based opinion assignment. As an initial matter, as discussed above in 
Section II.C, one would expect expertise-based opinion assignment to 
be at least somewhat common on the regional courts of appeals.  
The Guidelines themselves, at least early on, were an area ripe for 
expertise-based opinion assignment. First, given the novelty of the 
Guidelines scheme, no judge—trial or appellate—had judicial 
experience with the Guidelines prior to their effective date.112 The few 
judges who had experience with them were those members of the 
Sentencing Commission who drafted the initial Guidelines. Those 
judges, then, had significant expertise that none of their fellow judges 
had. 
Second, the Guidelines are fairly technical.113 As noted above, the 
Guidelines scheme introduced elements more familiar to administrative 
law than criminal law. The Guidelines issues that came before the 
courts, at least early on, were less likely to be ideologically charged.114  
                                                                                                                     
 111. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012). In 1994, the Commission elucidated that factors “not 
ordinarily” relevant to sentencing could justify a departure from the ordinary Guideline 
sentencing range if those factors removed the case from the Guidelines’ “heartland.” U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 & cmt. (2013) (policy statement). 
 112. Only a few states had sentencing guidelines regimes before the advent of the federal 
system. And the few that did, differed from the federal approach, particularly in that they did not 
constrain trial judges’ discretion at sentencing. Moreover, even those states that implemented 
guidelines programs in the wake of the federal program eschewed the federal model in favor of 
the preexisting state programs. See generally Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 679–80 
(1992) (explaining that states generally rejected guidelines resembling federal efforts).  
 113. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing 
Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 718 
(2008) (noting that the Guidelines’ regulations “rival the tax code in length”); Stephen Breyer, 
Justice Breyer: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1999, at 32 
(recognizing the “important criticism . . . that the guidelines are simply too long and too 
complicated”). 
 114. See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 241–53 (finding limited evidence of 
ideology influencing sentencing decisions, even post-Booker); Breyer, supra note 113, at 28 
(noting that Congress acted “in bipartisan fashion” in creating the Commission and calling for 
the introduction of sentencing guidelines); Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 113, at 715 n.4 
(“Senator Edward Kennedy was a sponsor of the Sentencing Reform Act, and President Reagan 
enthusiastically signed the legislation.”); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing 
Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 223, 266 (1993). 
This is not to say that Guidelines issues are devoid of ideological content. To the contrary, 
criminal law is an area where commentators have found strong evidence of ideological voting 
on the courts of appeals. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 17–19 
(2006). More specifically, Professors Gregory Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew Morriss found 
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Third, Guidelines issues certainly arise with enough frequency to 
make them valuable. Criminal cases occupy a large portion of the courts 
of appeals’ dockets.115 Moreover, the advent of the Guidelines invited 
more attorneys to raise sentencing issues. The Constitution guarantees 
criminal defendants the services of legal counsel, and government-
provided attorneys represent a substantial number of criminal 
defendants.116 In addition, appeal to the court of appeals is as of right.117 
                                                                                                                     
that the votes cast by district judges on the question of whether the Guidelines were 
constitutional prior to the Supreme Court’s clarifying decision in Mistretta, were influenced by 
the party of the President who appointed the judges. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & 
Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of 
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1403 (1998). Further, Professors Max 
Schanzenbach and Emerson Tiller have amassed empirical evidence that district courts tend to 
choose a method for departing from a Guideline range (whether upward or downward) that is 
more insulated from appellate review—i.e., that is subject to more deferential review by the 
court of appeals—when the court of appeals to which the appeal would lie is more ideologically 
distant from the sentencing district judge. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 32–33; 
Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 113, at 725. (It is important to note, however, that 
Schanzenbach and Tiller present no empirical evidence that in fact the courts of appeals engage 
in ideological voting in Guidelines cases; their data consist of sentences imposed by district 
judges, not the disposition of those sentences on appeal.) 
In the study here, I choose to consider cases decided during the time period from 1990–93 
in part because support for the Guidelines was more ideologically uniform (as the quotation in 
the text indicates), and because presumably early cases were more likely to raise questions about 
how the Guidelines were technically supposed to function, as opposed to issues about the choice 
of sentence within the rules of the Guidelines (which might invite more ideological debate). Cf. 
Sisk et al., supra, at 1407–09 (collecting data during 1988, before the Supreme Court’s Mistretta 
decision was handed down in early 1989); Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 35 (“We 
begin with 1992 because the Guidelines were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1989 and the 
permissibility of certain grounds for downward departures became clearer in the early 1990s.”).  
To be sure, there was hardly unanimous support for the Guidelines. Indeed, a large number 
of federal judges—including many district judges and appellate judges who had served as 
district judges—opposed the Guidelines on the ground that it reduced the discretionary authority 
of district judges. See, e.g., Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the 
Retirement Decisions of Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231, 235 (2004); Knapp & 
Hauptly, supra note 112, at 679 & n.1 (1992); Stith & Koh, supra, at 281. There is no evidence, 
however, nor does the literature suggest, that this opposition in any way correlated with 
ideology. 
 115. For example, for the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2013, there were 12,674 
federal criminal appeals on the dockets of the various regional federal courts of appeal; this 
constituted 29.68% of the courts’ total docket of 42,709 appeals. U.S. Courts of Appeals—
Nature of Suit or Offense in Cases Arising from the U.S. District Courts, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistic
s/2013/tables/B07Mar13.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).  
Note, moreover, that sentencing is a part even of criminal cases where the defendant pleads 
guilty, whether because of a plea bargain or otherwise. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 
98, at 28.  
 116.  Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-
Selection by the “Marginally Indigent,” 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 223, 238 (2005).  
34
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/3
2014] EXPERTISE AND OPINION ASSIGNMENT ON THE COURTS OF APPEALS 1633 
 
As a result, many attorneys appealing clients’ criminal convictions look 
for issues to raise that will not be completely meritless. The advent of 
the Guidelines provided attorneys with a number of arguments that were 
novel and at least colorable. Moreover, Guidelines issues very often 
were (and still are) substantial portions of criminal cases; often 
Guidelines issues dominated the questions raised in appeals.118  
Fourth, Guidelines issues arise across the regional circuit courts of 
appeals. Thus, the opportunity for a court with an expert judge in this 
area to reap reputation benefits was ripe.  
Fifth, even to the extent that the frequency with which Guidelines 
issues arise would allow other judges to develop some expertise in the 
area, the novelty of the Guidelines gave judges with Commission 
experience at least some expertise advantage vis-à-vis other judges for 
some period of time. 
Finally, it is possible to identify a period of time during which 
Guidelines cases were likely to be largely nonideological. The empirical 
study of Guidelines cases focuses on this period. Some commentators 
suggest that decision-making under the Guidelines had ideological 
elements during two time periods. From their initial promulgation in 
1987 until the Supreme Court ruled the Guidelines constitutional in 
1989,119 the predominant issue facing courts of appeals was whether the 
Guidelines were constitutional, an issue that invited ideological 
debate.120 Then, after the basic workings of the Guidelines had been 
fleshed out,121 the courts of appeals faced issues such as whether the 
trial courts had exercised their discretion properly in choosing a 
sentence length within the proper range.122 This, too, was an issue that 
                                                                                                                     
 117.  See Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
127, 161–62 (1995) (noting that while “the right to appeal has not explicitly been recognized as 
a federal constitutional right,” the right to appeal is a “sacrosanct” notion that is a “de facto part” 
of the American judicial system).  
 118. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World 
of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1100 (2001) (advancing sentencing as one of the most 
important components of criminal litigation).  
 119. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). 
 120. See Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 114, at 1381–82.  
 121. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 35 (noting that “the permissibility of 
certain grounds for downward departures became clearer in the early 1990s”). 
 122. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 113, at 719–20 (noting that the Supreme Court 
in a 1996 case required appellate courts to review a district court’s deviation from the 
Guidelines under the abuse of discretion standard, increasing the trial court’s risk of reversal). 
This period ended in 2005 with the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), ultimately holding mandatory application of the Guidelines to be unconstitutional. See 
supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text.  
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might divide judges along ideological lines.123 In between these periods, 
however—starting in 1989 and into the mid-1990s—was a period 
during which the courts of appeals, now assured of the Guidelines’ 
constitutionality, struggled instead with exactly how the Guidelines 
worked. The questions raised during this period were largely legal and 
technocratic; they were less likely to raise ideologically charged 
issues.124 
2.  Backgrounds of Judge Wilkins and Judge Breyer  
When the Sentencing Commission drafted the original Guidelines, 
William Wilkins—a Fourth Circuit Judge at the time—served as Chair, 
and Stephen Breyer—then a First Circuit judge—served as a 
Commissioner.125  
After graduating from the University of South Carolina School of 
Law in 1967, Judge Wilkins clerked for a Fourth Circuit judge, worked 
as a legal assistant for Senator Strom Thurmond, and worked in private 
practice.126 From 1974–1981, he served as a state solicitor in South 
Carolina.127  
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan appointed Wilkins as a United 
                                                                                                                     
 123. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 35 (presenting empirical evidence, 
beginning with decisions rendered in 1992, that district courts tend to choose a method for 
departing from a Guideline range (whether upward or downward) that is more insulated from 
appellate review—i.e., that is subject to more deferential review by the court of appeals—when 
the court of appeals to which the appeal would lie is more ideologically opposed to the 
sentencing district judge).  
 124. See id. (noting, with respect to a study presenting empirical evidence of ideological 
decision-making by district courts in sentencing cases, that “[w]e begin with 1992 because the 
Guidelines were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1989 and the permissibility of certain grounds 
for downward departures became clearer in the early 1990s”). 
 125. Stith & Koh, supra note 114, at 236 n.81 (noting Judge Wilkins’s chairmanship); 
Breyer, supra note 113, at 28 (noting that Justice Breyer served as an original member of the 
sentencing commission from 1985 to 1989 under Chairman Wilkins). George E. MacKinnon, 
then a Senior Circuit Judge on the District of Columbia Circuit, served as a Commissioner 
during that time. See David Binder, George E. MacKinnon, 89, Dies; Was Appeals Judge for 25 
Years, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/03/obituaries/george-e-
mackinnon-89-dies-was-appeals-judge-for-25-years.html; Former Commissioner Information, 
supra note 25. Judge MacKinnon sat on only fourteen panels during the time period that this 
Article studied; none was an appeal of a federal conviction. Most of the cases were special cases 
dedicated to challenges to the independent counsel law then in effect. Since Judge MacKinnon 
did not have the opportunity to author opinions in Guidelines cases, this Article leaves him out 
of the study.  
 126.  Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Wilkins, William Walker, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2586&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2014). 
 127. Id.  
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States District Judge for the District of South Carolina.128 In 1986, 
President Reagan elevated Judge Wilkins to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.129 Prior to that, in 1985, the President 
appointed Wilkins to another position: Chair of the newly formed 
United States Sentencing Commission.130 He served in that capacity 
until 1994.131 
After his tenure on the Sentencing Commission, Wilkins remained a 
circuit judge. He served as the Fourth Circuit’s Chief Judge from 2003 
to 2007.132 He assumed senior status in 2007 and, in 2008, retired from 
the bench and joined a private practice.133  
After graduating from Harvard Law School in 1964, Justice Breyer 
served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg.134 After 
a two-year period working in the Justice Department in the area of 
antitrust, he was a faculty member at Harvard Law School from 1967–
1994 (with a joint appointment at the Kennedy School of Government 
from 1977–1980), where a major area of expertise was administrative 
law.135 Breyer served as an assistant special prosecutor in the Watergate 
prosecutions, special counsel to the Administrative Practices 
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1974–1975, and 
chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1979–1980.136  
In 1980, President Jimmy Carter appointed Breyer as a United States 
Circuit Judge for the First Circuit.137 In 1985, President Reagan 
appointed Breyer as a Commissioner on the Sentencing Commission; he 
served in that capacity until 1989.138 In 1990, Breyer became Chief 
Judge of the First Circuit. He remained Chief Judge until President Bill 
Clinton appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1994.139  
While Judge Wilkins had considerable experience in criminal 
litigation before ascending to the bench, he had no prior experience with 
respect to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; indeed, he could have had 
                                                                                                                     
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
 130. See id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Breyer, Stephen Gerald, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=255&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Aug. 
25, 2014) [hereinafter Judge Breyer Biography].  
 135. Id. Justice Breyer is, even today a coauthor on one of the leading administrative law 
casebooks: STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES (7th ed. 2011).  
 136. Judge Breyer Biography, supra note 134.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id..  
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none. As a Commissioner responsible for drafting those Guidelines, he 
became one of the few people, let alone judges, most familiar with them 
when they took effect. While Judge Breyer lacked substantial prior 
criminal law experience, his experience with the Guidelines was 
similarly unique.140  
B.  Bankruptcy Cases and Former Federal Bankruptcy Judges 
Bankruptcy law is an especially apt area of law in which to initially 
test the theory of expertise outlined in the previous Section. Consider 
how well court of appeals bankruptcy cases map onto the paradigmatic 
types of cases where, according to Section II.C, one should expect to 
find expertise-based opinion assignment. As an initial matter, courts of 
appeals are likely settings for expertise-based opinion assignment. In 
general, circuit judges have no particular expertise in bankruptcy. 
                                                                                                                     
 140. Of course, Judge Wilkins’s and Judge Breyer’s expertise would only be valuable if 
that very expertise did not compel them to recuse themselves in Sentencing Guideline cases. In 
effect, this amounts to an all-or-nothing proposition: Blanket recusal would mean hearing no 
Guidelines cases; rejection of blanket recusal leaves the court free to deploy the judge to handle 
many such cases.  
Over the years, courts have rejected the argument that blanket recusal is mandated for 
judges who have served or are serving as Commissioners. See United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 
437, 445–47 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J., writing separately) (rejecting blanket recusal, but 
accepting that recusal might be appropriate in individual cases, depending upon the issues 
raised); United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335, 336–37 (4th Cir. 1991) (writing for the majority, 
Judge Wilkins noted that the three-judge panel unanimously rejected a recusal argument).  
Interestingly, in its unreported decision in United States v. McLellan, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that a district judge—selected for the Commission while a U.S. Attorney, but subsequently 
appointed to the bench—should have recused herself in a case where the defendant challenged 
the function of the Sentencing Commission. See In re United States, 60 F.3d 729, 730 (11th Cir. 
1995) (discussing the unpublished opinion of the court in United States v. McLellan, No. 93-
8177 (11th Cir. June 30, 1994)). The case was thereafter remanded, with further proceedings 
before a different district judge. Id. When the case reached the Eleventh Circuit again, the 
second panel expressly limited the recusal holding to the case at hand: 
We emphatically disavow . . . any intention to adopt in this published 
opinion the prior McLellan opinion’s holding on the recusal issue. While that 
holding may be law of the case insofar as this panel is concerned, because the 
prior McLellan opinion was unpublished, its holding on the recusal issue is not 
law of this circuit and will not be binding on any future panel in a case 
involving a different defendant. 
Id. at 731 n.2. 
Judge Wilkins did recuse himself in the Guidelines case of United States v. Carroll, 3 F.3d 
98, 99 n.* (4th Cir. 1993). In Carroll, the government argued that the Commission had exceeded 
its authority in promulgating certain Guidelines. Id. at 101–02. For discussion and critique of the 
Guidelines recusal issue, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: 
Mistretta and Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 437–40 (1997). 
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Moreover, bankruptcy is an area of law where expertise is likely, 
according to the theory, to be an important consideration in opinion 
assignment. First, bankruptcy cases in general seem to fall within the 
rubric of “nonideological cases.” Commentators have long questioned 
whether the ideological pressures found to influence judicial voting in 
other areas extend to bankruptcy.141 In a recent empirical study, Rafael 
Pardo and I searched in vain for evidence of ideological voting by court 
of appeals judges in bankruptcy cases.142 
Second, bankruptcy is both substantively and procedurally distinct as 
an area of law. On substance, bankruptcy proceedings are guided by a 
“Bankruptcy Code” (the “Code”), which occupies its own title of the 
United States Code. The Code is complex, and many of its provisions 
are technical.143 Further, the Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure provide for various procedures unique to bankruptcy.  
Moreover, federal bankruptcy litigation occurs within a unique 
judicial hierarchy, depicted in Figure 1.144 Congress has seen fit to 
create bankruptcy courts as “unit[s]” of the various federal district 
courts.145 While Congress has technically left it to the discretion of the 
                                                                                                                     
 141. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 114, at 16 (“Might ideological voting and panel 
effects be found in apparently nonideological cases involving, for example, bankruptcy, torts, 
and civil procedure?”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 831, 842 (2008) (“Many areas of law remain entirely unstudied in the standard 
terms, including, for example, antitrust, intellectual property, and bankruptcy. It would be useful 
to know in which areas of law and under what circumstances the judicial personality has the 
greatest (and the least) influence on decisions.”).  
 142. See Principal-Agent Theory, supra note 40, at 334–35 (noting that the empirical 
analysis produced no evidence that ideology influenced voting behavior by bankruptcy judges).  
 143. See, e.g., Bradley M. Elbein, An Obscure Revolution: The Liability of Professionals in 
Bankruptcy, 48 S.C. L. REV. 743, 745 n.9 (1997) (“[Unlike o]ther complex statutes,” the 
“Bankruptcy Code consists of a thick volume of exceptions to a set of general rules never 
explicitly and positively expressed by the statute itself but implicitly understood by 
practitioners.”).  
 144.  It should be noted that appellate review of a bankruptcy court’s decision can involve 
direct appeal from the bankruptcy court to the court of appeals, with the effect of bypassing the 
first tier of intermediate appellate review—the district court or the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
(BAP). An appeal may proceed directly to the court of appeals pursuant to a certification 
procedure if one of the following circumstances exists: (i) the appeal involves a question of law 
unresolved by the court of appeals for the circuit or by the Supreme Court; (ii) the appeal 
involves a matter of public importance; (iii) the appeal involves a question of law requiring 
resolution of conflicting decisions; or (iv) the appeal may materially advance the progress of the 
case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (2006). For a detailed 
discussion of the use of this appellate path, see Laura B. Bartell, The Appeal of Direct Appeal—
Use of the New 28 U.S.C. §158(d)(2), 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 145 (2010) and Lindsey Freeman, 
Comment, BAPCPA and Bankruptcy Direct Appeals: The Impact of Procedural Uncertainty on 
Predictable Precedent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 543 (2011). 
 145. See 28 U.S.C. § 151. 
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district courts to decide whether to refer bankruptcy cases in the first 
instance to the bankruptcy courts,146 in practice every federal district has 
a standing order that sends all bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy court 
within the district for initial proceedings.147  
Bankruptcy judges staff the bankruptcy courts. These non-Article III 
judges are appointed for fourteen-year terms by the judges of the court 
of appeals for the circuit in which the district in question lies.148  
Bankruptcy judges may enter final judgments with respect to “core 
proceedings,” which constitute the heart of bankruptcy issues.149 Appeal 
from a final judgment in a core proceeding is ordinarily made to the 
federal district court. However, the Judicial Code authorizes—indeed 
urges—circuits to create bankruptcy appellate panels (BAPs)—tribunals 
consisting of bankruptcy judges to hear appeals from the bankruptcy 
courts in the circuit.150 In circuits that have them—currently the First, 
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits151—litigants appealing a 
bankruptcy court judgment have the option of having their appeal heard 
by either the district court or a three-judge BAP panel; both litigants 
must consent to have an appeal heard by the BAP.152 Whether this 
initial appeal is heard by the district court or the BAP, a second appeal 
as of right lies to the court of appeals, with discretionary review by the 
Supreme Court possible thereafter.153  
  
                                                                                                                     
 146. See id. § 157(a). 
 147. Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate 
Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1756 (2008).  
 148. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1); see also id. § 152(a)(3) (“Whenever a majority of the judges of 
any court of appeals cannot agree upon the appointment of a bankruptcy judge, the chief judge 
of such court shall make such appointment.”).  
 149. See id. § 157(b)(1). Bankruptcy courts may also hear, but not enter final judgments in, 
“a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11.” 
Id. § 157(c)(1). Bankruptcy courts’ findings in non-core proceedings are reviewable de novo by 
the district courts. Id. 
 150. See id. § 158(b)(1).  
 151. Nash & Pardo, supra note 147, at 1757.  
 152. See id. at 1757–58 (describing the appeals process for adjudications made by 
bankruptcy courts). The judges of a federal district may vote to not participate in the BAP. 28 
U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). If the judges for a district so vote, then all bankruptcy court appeals from 
that district must be heard by the district court, notwithstanding the existence of a BAP. Id. 
§ 158(a). 
BAP judges are selected judges by, and for terms set by, each circuit’s judicial council. 
BAP judges continue to hear cases as trial judges in addition to their BAP responsibilities. See 
id. § 158(b)(1); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for 
Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 632, 661 (2002); Thomas E. Carlson, The Case 
for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 1990 BYU L. REV. 545, 558.  
 153. Nash & Pardo, supra note 147, at 1757–58.  
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FIGURE 1 
BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE STRUCTURE FOR CORE PROCEEDINGS 
 
A third reason expertise is likely in bankruptcy law is that few circuit 
judges have experience in the area, let alone in deciding bankruptcy 
cases as bankruptcy judges. As described below, this Article identified 
only six circuit judges who ever served as bankruptcy judges (one of 
whom was appointed to the court of appeals only in September of 
2011).  
Fourth, bankruptcy issues certainly arise with enough frequency to 
make them valuable. Bankruptcy cases occupy a large portion of the 
courts of appeals’ dockets.  
Fifth, bankruptcy issues arise across the regional circuit courts of 
appeals. Thus, there is plenty of opportunity for a court with a judge 
with bankruptcy expertise to reap reputation benefits.  
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judges who had prior experience as federal bankruptcy judges by 
conducting a search of Federal Judicial Center data on federal judges154 
for the term “bankruptcy.”  
Six circuit judges met the criterion: Judge Conrad K. Cyr of the First 
Circuit (who, while serving as a bankruptcy judge, also served as chief 
judge of the original First Circuit BAP155); Judges Alice M. Batchelder, 
R. Guy Cole, and Bernice B. Donald of the Sixth Circuit; Judge Michael 
J. Melloy of the Eighth Circuit; and Judge John C. Porfilio of the Tenth 
Circuit.156 (Table B1 in Appendix B summarizes the pertinent 
information.) Because Judge Donald was appointed to the circuit only in 
September of 2011,157 empirical analysis concerned the remaining five 
judges. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This Part describes my empirical analysis. Section IV.A describes 
the methodology by which I assembled three new primary datasets—
one for Judge Wilkins, one for Judge Breyer, and a third covering 
former bankruptcy judges—and the coding of variables. Section IV.B 
explores whether the evidence supports the hypotheses laid out at the 
end of Part III.  
A.  Methodology 
1.  Primary Datasets158 
Judge Wilkins—I compiled the Wilkins dataset by identifying all 
criminal law cases decided by three-judge panels of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit during the calendar years 1990, 
                                                                                                                     
 154. The data is available at Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FED. 
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).  
 155. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Cyr, Conrad Keefe, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=552&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Aug. 
25, 2014) [hereinafter Judge Cyr Biography]. Congress originally authorized the federal circuits 
to create BAPs under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. 8 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM 
L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 170:6 (3d ed. 2014). Two circuits—
the First and the Ninth—accepted this invitation. The First Circuit disbanded its BAP in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87–88 (1982), which found the judicial organization provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act to be unconstitutional. The First Circuit only reconstituted the BAP in 
the 1990s. See Nash & Pardo, supra note 147, at 1779 n.122.  
 156. Until January 8, 1996, Judge Porfilio served under the name John P. Moore. For ease 
of exposition, I refer to the judge simply as Judge Porfilio.  
 157. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Donald, Bernice Bouie, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=631&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Aug. 
25, 2014).  
 158. As I explain below, I collected additional data to test various hypotheses.  
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1991, 1992, and 1993,159 in which (i) Judge Wilkins served on the 
panel, and (ii) a signed majority opinion was filed (iii) with Judge 
Wilkins as part of that majority. I identified these cases by using 
Boolean searches of Westlaw’s “federal criminal justice” database.160  
The search generated 97 cases.161 Sixty-nine of those cases were 
appeals of federal criminal convictions—on which the analysis focuses. 
Only 5 of those cases were unpublished; this is consistent with the 
notion that unpublished opinions are usually unsigned per curiam 
opinions. Of the 69 cases, Judge Wilkins did not join the majority in 
two.  
The Wilkins dataset includes 67 federal criminal appeals cases in 
which Judge Wilkins could have been assigned to author the majority 
opinion. Of those, Judge Wilkins authored 41. Of the 67 federal 
criminal appeals, 42 cases raised Guidelines issues. Of those 42 cases, 
Judge Wilkins wrote the opinions in 30 cases. Tables B2 and B3 in 
Appendix B break out these cases by year.  
Judge Breyer—Along similar lines, I compiled the Breyer dataset by 
identifying all criminal law cases decided by three-judge panels of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit during the calendar 
years 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993, in which (i) Judge Breyer served on 
the panel, and (ii) a signed majority opinion was filed (iii) with Judge 
Breyer as part of that majority.  
The Westlaw search generated 244 cases,162 of which 165 were 
                                                                                                                     
 159. I began searching with 1990 since the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the Commission and its Guidelines (at least as a matter of legislative delegation and separation 
of powers) in its January 18, 1989 decision in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 
(1989). While cases decided in 1990 (or later) conceivably could have been argued while the 
constitutionality of the Guidelines remained an open issue, in fact the earliest Fourth Circuit 
case raising a Sentencing Guideline issue was argued on October 5, 1989. United States v. 
Jones, 907 F.2d 456, 456, 457 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing defendant–appellants’ argument that 
the district court incorrectly applied the federal Sentencing Guidelines). One state habeas case 
was argued at the end of 1988 and still fell within the dataset. McDougall v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 
518 (4th Cir. 1990) (argued Dec. 9, 1988). 
 160. Westlaw’s FCJ-CS database “includes federal cases that relate to criminal acts and the 
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of crimes.” Practice Area Fundamentals: Criminal 
Law Fundamentals, WESTLAW, http://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/CrimLaw10.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2014).  
 161. The first search was: pr(“fourth circuit”) & wilkins & da(1990 1991 1992 1993) % 
curiam. The search yielded 84 cases where Judge Wilkins was part of a three-judge panel. 
Because the first search excluded signed opinions where an opinion cited another case and 
indicated that that decision was “per curiam,” I performed a second search to correct for the first 
search’s underinclusion: pr(“fourth circuit”) & wilkins & da(1990 1991 1992 1993) & curiam /s 
(“u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d” “f.3d”). The second search yielded 13 more cases.  
 162. The first search was: pr(“first circuit”) & breyer & da(1990 1991 1992 1993) % 
curiam. The search yielded 186 cases where Judge Breyer was part of a three-judge panel. 
Because the first search excluded signed opinions where an opinion cited another case and 
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criminal appeals—on which my analysis focuses. Only 2 of those cases 
were unpublished. Of the 165 cases, Judge Breyer did not join the 
majority opinion in 1 (pretrial release) case. In the end, then, there were 
164 federal criminal cases in which Judge Breyer could have been 
assigned the majority opinion; Judge Breyer made the opinion 
assignment in all but 6 of those cases (and in all but 1 of the 75 
Guidelines cases within that number). A breakdown of the number of 
cases per year appears in Table B5 in Appendix B. 
The Breyer dataset includes 164 federal criminal cases in which 
Judge Breyer could have been assigned to author the majority opinion. 
Of those, Judge Breyer authored 61. Of the 164 federal criminal cases, 
75 cases raised Guidelines issues. Of those 75 cases, Judge Breyer 
wrote the opinions in 34 cases. Tables B4 and B5 in Appendix B break 
out these cases by year.  
Former federal bankruptcy judges—I collected bankruptcy cases 
that were decided through February of 2012. For Judges Cyr, Melloy, 
and Porfilio, I performed searches in the Westlaw databases containing 
bankruptcy cases from the relevant circuit.163 I searched for all three-
judge panel cases164 that contained the word “bankruptcy”165 and in 
which the judge in question was a member of the majority coalition. I 
included all cases that originated in the bankruptcy courts; I also 
included other cases that actually raised issues of bankruptcy law.166 I 
included only signed opinions. In addition, I excluded cases in which 
someone who had been a bankruptcy judge but at the time was only a 
district judge (i.e., the judge had yet to be appointed to the circuit) sat 
on a court of appeals case by designation. 
For the Sixth Circuit—on which two former bankruptcy judges sat 
during the relevant time period—I used a very similar approach. Here, 
however, I included cases where a former bankruptcy judge was not 
part of the majority, provided that the other former bankruptcy judge 
was part of the majority.  
                                                                                                                     
indicated that that decision was “per curiam,” I performed a second search to correct for the first 
search’s underinclusion: pr(“first circuit”) & breyer & da(1990 1991 1992 1993) & curiam /s 
(“u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d” “f.3d”). The second search yielded 58 additional cases.  
 163. For example, for Judge Cyr—who serves on the First Circuit—the relevant database 
was “FBKR-CS1.” 
 164. I did not include “en banc” cases; I did include cases that were originally designated 
to be heard by three-judge panels, but where one of the original panel members (other than the 
former bankruptcy judge) dropped out (for example, because of recusal or illness), leaving the 
cases to be decided by panels of two judges.  
 165. The Westlaw bankruptcy databases include some cases that raise issues of liquidation 
but not federal bankruptcy law.  
 166. For example, I included criminal cases in which the defendant had been convicted of 
bankruptcy fraud, provided that the appeal raised an issue of bankruptcy law. 
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Table B6 in Appendix B provides summary data on the number of 
cases in which a former bankruptcy judge was part of the majority 
coalition and in which a signed opinion was issued, and the number 
(and percentage) of those cases in which the former bankruptcy judge 
wrote the opinion. This information is provided both by circuit and 
cumulatively.  
2.  Coding 
The bankruptcy datasets include all federal bankruptcy cases in 
which one of the former bankruptcy judges was part of the majority 
panel coalition. The Guidelines datasets include all appeals from federal 
convictions where either Judge Wilkins or Judge Breyer (depending 
upon the circuit) was part of the majority panel coalition. For the 
Guidelines datasets, I coded each case to indicate whether the case 
involved the appeal of a federal criminal conviction. The 67 Wilkins 
cases and 164 Breyer cases that did I then coded to indicate whether the 
case raised any Sentencing Guideline issue. 
For each of the cases in each of the datasets (i.e., both the Guidelines 
and bankruptcy datasets), I coded: (i) the case name, citation, and date 
of decision, (ii) the identities of the judges in the majority, (iii) the 
identity of the judge who had opinion assignment responsibility,167 
                                                                                                                     
 167. I coded the senior member of the majority coalition as the assigning judge. See 28 
U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006) (specifying that, after the chief judge, “[o]ther circuit judges of the court 
in regular active service shall have precedence and preside according to the seniority of their 
commissions”); see, e.g., 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 32.1(a)(1) (“The presiding judge [on the panel] assigns 
opinion-writing responsibility.”); 8TH CIR. I.O.P. IV.A (“The presiding judge on the panel 
assigns each case for preparation of a signed opinion, per curiam opinion, or a dispositive 
order.”). 
There are three bases on which one might object to my coding protocol. None of these 
ultimately provides enough of a reason to vary from the protocol. First, some court rules (such 
as those quoted earlier in this footnote) technically give the presiding judge and chief judge the 
power to assign opinions even when the presiding judge is not part of the majority. See Cheng, 
supra note 10, at 527 n.35 (noting that several circuits’ rules seem to allow this, and noting an 
email from Judge Richard Posner confirming that “the Seventh Circuit allows the presiding 
judge to assign majority opinions even if he or she is in dissent”). Still, in the few cases where 
the presiding judge did not join the majority opinion, I coded the senior-most in the majority 
coalition as the assigning judge: Even if some courts’ rules technically empower the presiding 
judge to recommend assignments in such cases, I reason that the presiding judge will be unlikely 
not to recommend assigning the opinion to the next-senior-most judge if in fact that judge wants 
to write the opinion. 
Second, some courts give the chief judge some opinion assignment power even if the chief 
judge is not in the majority or indeed even on the panel. For example, Fourth Circuit internal 
rules empower the chief judge to make assignments upon the recommendations of the 
“presiding judge” of each panel. Id. at 530 n.53. In practice, however, the power given to the 
chief judge may be largely symbolic: “anecdotally, the prerogative of the chief judge is rarely if 
ever exercised.” Id. 
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(iv) the party of the President who appointed the judge who had opinion 
assignment responsibility, (v) the identity of the judge who drafted the 
opinion, (v) whether the opinion was a published opinion, (vi) the 
number of West headnotes in the case that pertained to the area of 
expertise—i.e., the Guidelines or bankruptcy, as appropriate 
(“Guidelines Headnotes” or “Bankruptcy Headnotes”), and (vii) the 
ratio of the number of West headnotes in the case that pertained to 
bankruptcy to the total number of West headnotes (“Guidelines 
Headnote Ratio” or “Bankruptcy Headnote Ratio”).  
I coded a few additional variables for the Guidelines datasets. With 
respect to the Wilkins dataset, I coded whether Democrats constituted a 
majority of the panel; whether (besides Judge Wilkins) another federal 
district judge or former federal district judge sat on the panel; and 
whether (besides Judge Wilkins) another former prosecutor sat on the 
panel. With respect to the Breyer dataset, I coded whether Republicans 
constituted a majority of the panel; whether any federal district judge or 
former federal district judge sat on the panel; and whether any former 
prosecutor sat on the panel.  
                                                                                                                     
Third, some courts of appeals have shifted to a system where the assigning judge assigns 
two responsibilities in a case: first, responsibility for drafting a bench memorandum that all 
judges who will hear the case share and, second, responsibility for drafting the opinion in the 
case. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 72–73. Though the assigning judge may theoretically assign 
the two responsibilities to different judges, in practice this is rarely the case (except where the 
judge responsible for the bench memorandum is not part of the majority coalition). See id.  
Commentators are divided over the extent to which the practice of shared bench memoranda 
is growing (if not widespread). Compare Maxwell L. Stearns, Appellate Courts Inside and Out, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 1764, 1766 (2003) (reviewing COHEN, supra note 9) (describing, based on 
Cohen’s discussion, the preparation of a single bench memorandum for shared use by a panel as 
“the increasingly common practice in several circuits”), with Don Songer, Book Review, 12 L. 
& POL. BOOK REV. 373, 375 (2002) (reviewing COHEN, supra note 9) (criticizing Cohen for 
creating the impression that the practice is more widespread than it really is, and noting that 
Songer’s “own interviews suggest that this sharing of a bench memo is not used in the First, 
Third, or Tenth Circuits,” and “[s]o rather than being a common practice, this procedure may be 
largely limited to the Ninth Circuit”), and Wald, supra note 86, at 14 (noting the use of the 
practice on the D.C. Circuit only for “monster cases”).  
This debate does not affect my coding protocol. First, there is commentary indicating that 
the First Circuit does not employ the practice. See Songer, supra, at 375; Kermit Lipez, Judges 
and Their Law Clerks: Some Reflections, 22 ME. B.J. 112, 114 (2007) (discussing the opinion 
assignment process on the First Circuit in a manner that seems inconsistent with prior 
assignment of a single bench memorandum for the panel). My personal experience as a law 
clerk for a Fourth Circuit judge during part of the period under study here indicates that the 
Fourth Circuit did not employ the practice. Second, and more important, even if the system were 
in use and assigning judges usually assigned opinions to the judges to whom they had 
previously assigned responsibility to draft bench memoranda, similar incentives would guide 
assigning judges to consider the same criteria—including whether or not the assignee judges had 
expertise—in making assignments of bench memoranda. See supra note 86.  
46
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/3
2014] EXPERTISE AND OPINION ASSIGNMENT ON THE COURTS OF APPEALS 1645 
 
The key dependent variable for all datasets was whether a judge with 
the relevant expertise—either a Sentencing Commissioner or a former 
bankruptcy judge—authored the opinion in the case. 
3.  Random Assignment of Opinions 
Before proceeding further, a discussion of random assignment of 
opinions is necessary. My research design assumes that the cases in the 
dataset represent a random sample of Guidelines and bankruptcy cases 
that came before the courts of appeals in question. While the common 
belief is that courts of appeals assign cases and judges to panels at 
random,168 Professor Matthew Hall has questioned the extent to which 
court of appeals cases are in fact randomly assigned to panels.169 The 
results of my study are subject to some question if a circuit did not 
randomly assign Guidelines or bankruptcy cases to panels (and judges).  
I sought to dispel this concern by collecting original datasets, 
consisting of all bankruptcy cases—whether per curiam or signed, and 
no matter who served on the panel—issued by each circuit during a 
calendar year shortly after the former bankruptcy judge’s appointment 
to the circuit. To evaluate Judge Wilkins’s service, I collected all federal 
criminal cases—and, necessarily contained within that group, all 
Guidelines cases—decided by the Fourth Circuit in 1990.170 
With respect to the bankruptcy cases, for each circuit, I used a 
binomial test to determine whether the former bankruptcy judge was 
disproportionately represented on panels hearing bankruptcy cases.171 
                                                                                                                     
 168. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and 
the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 
259 (1995) (describing the standard belief that federal courts randomly assign cases to judges); 
COHEN, supra note 9, at 73. 
 169. See Hall, supra note 67, at 585.  
 170. Although I have not tested random assignment with respect to Judge Breyer in 
Guidelines cases, I did test random assignment in bankruptcy cases on the First Circuit in 1993, 
a year covered by my Guidelines study.  
 171. To determine the expected proportion, I first determined the number, m, of non-senior 
circuit judges (including the former bankruptcy judge) during the year in question. Since (as the 
data bear out) some panels include two non-senior circuit judges plus one other judge (whether a 
senior circuit judge, or a district judge or judge from another circuit sitting by designation), I set 
(m + 1) as the total pool of available judges. Then the number of possible combinations of non-
senior circuit judges on panels is F = (m + 1)C3, while the number of possible combinations of 
two-judge contingents of which a lone former bankruptcy judge may possibly be a part is E = 
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Table B7 in Appendix B presents the results. The Sixth Circuit data 
regarding Judge Batchelder from both 1994 and 1998 suggests that we 
should reject the null hypothesis of random distribution of cases to 
panels. The other results are entirely consistent with random assignment 
of cases. The data from assignment of Fourth Circuit federal criminal 
and Guidelines appeals to Judge Wilkins—presented in Table B8 in 
Appendix B—are also entirely consistent with random assignment of 
cases to judges and panels.  
Beyond random assignment of cases to judges, Professor Hall’s 
research indicates that certain combinations of judges on panels are 
more, or less, likely to issue per curiam opinions.172 Accordingly, I 
examined whether the presence of a former bankruptcy judge—or Judge 
Wilkins—on a panel changed the likelihood of the panel issuing a per 
curiam decision.  
With respect to the bankruptcy cases, with one exception, the data—
summarized in Table B9 in Appendix B—are clear across the circuits 
that there is no statistically significant change in the likelihood of 
having per curiam opinions issue. The one outlier is the percentage of 
opinions decided per curiam in 1998 when Judge Batchelder sat on the 
panel. Interestingly, however, this result goes in the opposite direction 
of that which strategic application of the theory here would suggest. 
One might expect that Judge Batchelder, as an expert in bankruptcy, 
would tend to issue more signed bankruptcy opinions than would an 
average judge, yet the 1998 data indicate that her presence on a panel 
resulted in fewer than average signed bankruptcy opinions.  
With respect to the Wilkins dataset, the data—summarized in Table 
B10 in Appendix B—indicate that the inclusion of Judge Wilkins on a 
panel clearly had no effect on the rate at which per curiam opinions 
were issued in federal criminal appeals. In contrast, having Judge 
Wilkins on a Guidelines panel reduced, with statistical significance, the 
likelihood of a per curiam decision. Thus, the finding I describe below 
that shows Judge Wilkins receiving disproportionate opinion 
assignments in Guidelines cases may be due in part—but not 
                                                                                                                     
 
It is this ratio that is reflected in the 5th column of Tables B7 and B8 in Appendix B. 
 172. Professor Hall’s data reflect that some panel combinations were more likely than 
others to issue unpublished opinions, see Hall, supra note 67, at 579, and unpublished opinions, 
which tend to be per curiam.  
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entirely173—to Judge Wilkins’s penchant to issue signed opinions in 
those cases.174 Note, however, that assigning judges reasonably would 
have known of this tendency, and presumably would have assigned 
opinions to Judge Wilkins anticipating that he might be inclined to issue 
signed opinions in Guidelines cases.175 Moreover, while the effect on 
efficiency is unclear, having Judge Wilkins issue signed opinions would 
certainly offer the Fourth Circuit legitimacy and reputation benefits.176 
Thus, the disproportionate issuance of signed opinions by Judge 
Wilkins in Guidelines cases is broadly consistent with the theory I 
advance above in Parts I and II.  
In sum, the data generally support the random assignment of cases to 
judges. They also indicate that the presence of a judge with relevant 
expertise on the panel did not, as a general matter, affect with statistical 
significance the rate at which decisions were rendered per curiam. 
Moreover, to the extent there is reason to doubt random assignment—in 
particular of bankruptcy cases to Sixth Circuit judges who were 
previously bankruptcy judges—the data show that, if anything, these 
judges received fewer, not more, opinion assignments in bankruptcy 
cases; this helps dispel the notion that, to the extent there was 
nonrandom assignment, it was done to increase the ability of judges 
with expertise to author opinions. On these findings, the next Section 
describes the empirical tests of the hypotheses. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 173. Consider that, while the difference between the rate at which Judge Wilkins, and the 
general rate at which the Fourth Circuit, issued per curiam opinions is statistically significant, 
the substantive difference—62.50% versus 74.71%—is not large. To put it in context, consider 
that in the 1990 dataset Judge Wilkins wrote 10 of the 15 signed opinions issued when he was 
on a Guidelines panel. If those panels had issued per curiam opinions at the rate generally 
observed on the Fourth Circuit in Guidelines cases, then Wilkins’s panels would have generated 
only around 10 signed opinions instead of 15. Assuming that all 5 of the opinions that would 
now be per curiam were in fact written by Judge Wilkins, it still would be the case that Judge 
Wilkins would have authored 5 of the 10 signed opinions. That 50.00% authorship rate is still 
far in excess of the 33.33% rate one would expect with random opinion assignment, thus 
indicating that the disproportionate rate at which Judge Wilkins wrote Guidelines opinions 
results from more than just his penchant to issue signed opinions.  
 174. Cf. Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Functions, 76 
JUDICATURE 29, 31 (1992) (explaining that the decision to issue an opinion per curiam is made 
by the judge assigned to write the opinion). 
 175. In the 1990 dataset, Judge Wilkins was never the assigning judge in a Guidelines case. 
 176. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 549 (noting that opinions delivered by expert judges are 
likely to garner more legitimacy).  
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B.  Results and Analysis 
1.  Hypothesis 1—Disproportionate Assignment of Opinions to Judges 
with Expertise 
Beginning with the Wilkins dataset, I first used a binomial test177 to 
assess the likelihood that the extent to which Judge Wilkins was 
assigned cases was simply the result of chance. The assignment to 
Judge Wilkins of the opinion in 41 of 67 federal criminal cases178 in 
which he could have written the opinion179—or 41 of 69 cases if one 
includes the two cases where Judge Wilkins was on the panel but not in 
the majority—differs, with statistical significance, from the expected 
outcome, based upon truly random assignment, that Judge Wilkins 
would be assigned the opinion in one-third of all cases.180 Similarly, the 
assignment to Judge Wilkins of the opinion in 30 of 42 Guidelines 
cases181 in which he could have written the opinion—or 30 of 43 cases 
if one includes the lone such case where Judge Wilkins was on the panel 
but not in the majority—differs, with statistical significance, from the 
expected outcome of one-third.182  
Second, I compared (i) the ratio of the number of (three-judge panel) 
federal criminal cases and Guidelines cases decided in 1991 in which 
Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion for the court to the total number of 
(three-judge panel) cases decided in 1991 in which Judge Wilkins sat on 
the panel, with (ii) the ratio of the number of (three-judge panel) cases 
(of all subject matters) decided in 1991 in which Judge Wilkins wrote 
the opinion for the court to the total number of (three-judge panel) cases 
                                                                                                                     
 177. In keeping with other studies of opinion assignment, I do not employ regression 
analysis here. While the dichotomy between whether or not a judge is assigned to write an 
opinion may suggest use of logistic regressions, in fact that would not be appropriate: A logistic 
regression would assume that the null hypothesis is that a judge is not assigned an opinion when 
expertise is absent, when the equal workload norm suggests instead that a judge without 
expertise should receive around one-third of opinion assignments in the absence of expertise. 
The norm also means that even a judge with expertise in an area is highly unlikely to receive 
responsibility to write the opinion in all cases in that area, again an outcome not contemplated 
by a logistic regression.  
 178. See infra Appendix B, Table B2. 
 179. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 414–15 (using as the basis of analysis for each judge 
“the ratio of the number of opinions written to the number of times that the judge participated in 
the majority decision and was therefore eligible to write an opinion for the court”). See 
generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 367 (“The equality to which the norm refers is 
absolute equality, not that which is conditioned on the frequency with which any given justice is 
a member of the conference vote coalition.”).  
 180. p < 0.01 in both cases.  
 181. See infra Appendix B, Table B3.  
 182. Again, p < 0.01 in both cases.  
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decided in 1991 in which Judge Wilkins sat on the panel.183  
Similar to the searches used to isolate the criminal justice cases in 
which Judge Wilkins participated, I used two Westlaw searches in the 
“CTA4” database (which contains all Fourth Circuit opinions) to find 
all 1991 Fourth Circuit cases in which Judge Wilkins participated and 
that yielded a signed majority opinion.184 Together, the two searches 
yielded 53 total opinions. Judge Wilkins authored 22 of those 53 
opinions.  
I then performed a chi-squared test to determine whether the opinion 
assignment rate to Judge Wilkins in appeals from federal convictions 
was different, with statistical significance, from the overall rate at which 
Judge Wilkins was assigned opinions to draft. (Here, in keeping with 
the idea that, according to workload norms, Judge Wilkins should be 
expected ultimately to receive approximately one-third of all cases in 
which he sat on the panel, I included cases where Judge Wilkins was 
not part of the majority coalition.) Panel A of Table B11 in Appendix B 
summarizes the data and results.  
A similar test confirms that the assignment rate to Judge Wilkins in 
Guidelines cases differs, with statistical significance, from the rate in 
cases overall. This is summarized in Panel B of Table B11 in Appendix 
B. 
I also compared the assignment of both federal criminal appeals and 
Guidelines cases to Judge Wilkins when Judge Wilkins was the only 
Republican appointee on the panel, whether there was a current district 
judge or another former district judge on the panel, and whether there 
was another former prosecutor on the panel.185 None of these factors 
had any statistically significant effect on the disproportionate rate at 
which Judge Wilkins was assigned federal criminal appeals and 
Guidelines cases.  
I performed similar analyses on the Breyer database. I first used a 
binomial test to assess the likelihood that the extent to which Judge 
Breyer was assigned cases was simply the result of chance. The 
assignment to Judge Breyer of the opinion in 61 of 164 federal criminal 
cases in which he could have written the opinion186 (or 61 of 165 cases 
                                                                                                                     
 183. See infra Appendix B, Table B11.  
 184. The first search was: da(1991) & wilkins % curiam. It yielded 66 documents. Of those 
cases, Judge Wilkins did not sit on the panel in 4 cases, 10 cases were decided en banc, and 1 
case was decided per curiam (and was pulled up because of the misspelling “curium”). 
Eliminating those 15 cases left 51 cases. 
The second search was: da(1991) & wilkins & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d” “f.3d”. It 
yielded 6 documents, 2 of which were en banc cases and 2 of which were per curiam opinions, 
thus leaving 2 additional opinions.  
 185. See infra Appendix B, Table B22.  
 186. See infra Appendix B, Table B4.  
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if one includes the lone case where Judge Breyer was on the panel but 
not in the majority) does not differ with statistical significance from the 
expected outcome, based upon truly random assignment, that Judge 
Breyer would be assigned the opinion in one-third of all cases.187 
However, the assignment to Judge Breyer of the opinion in 34 of 75 
Guidelines cases in which he could have written the opinion188 does 
differ, with statistical significance, from the expected outcome of one-
third.189 
I next compared (i) the ratio of the number of (three-judge panel) 
federal criminal cases and Guidelines cases decided in 1991 in which 
Judge Breyer wrote the opinion for the court to the total number of 
(three-judge panel) cases decided in 1991 in which Judge Breyer sat on 
the panel, with (ii) the ratio of the number of (three-judge panel) cases 
(of all subject matters) decided in 1991 in which Judge Breyer wrote the 
opinion for the court to the total number of (three-judge panel) cases 
decided in 1991 in which Judge Breyer sat on the panel.190  
I again used two Westlaw searches—this time in the “CTA1” 
database (which contains all First Circuit opinions)—to find all 1991 
First Circuit cases in which Judge Breyer participated and that yielded a 
signed majority opinion.191 Together, the two searches yielded 135 total 
opinions. Judge Breyer authored 43 of those 135 opinions.192  
I then performed a chi-squared test to determine whether the rate of 
opinion assignment to Judge Breyer in appeals from federal convictions 
was different, with statistical significance, from the overall rate at which 
Judge Breyer was assigned opinions to draft. In keeping with the idea 
that, according to workload norms, Judge Breyer should be expected 
ultimately to be assigned approximately one-third of all cases in which 
he sat on the panel, I included cases where Judge Breyer was not part of 
the majority coalition. Panel A of Table B12 in Appendix B summarizes 
the data and results, which have statistical significance, although only at 
the 10% level.193  
  
                                                                                                                     
 187. p > 0.32.  
 188. See infra Appendix B, Table B5.  
 189. p < 0.04.  
 190. See infra Appendix B, Table B12.  
 191. The first search was: da(1991) & breyer % curiam. It yielded 119 documents. Of those 
cases, Judge Breyer did not sit on the panel in 3 cases, 4 cases were decided en banc, and 2 
cases were decided by unsigned “Order of the Court.” These 2 cases were picked up because 
they were not denominated “per curiam.” Eliminating these 9 cases left 110 cases. 
The second search was: da(1991) & breyer & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d”. It yielded 35 
additional opinions.  
 192. See infra Appendix B, Table B12.  
 193. Id.  
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A similar test confirms that the assignment rate to Judge Breyer in 
Guidelines cases differs, with strong statistical significance, from the 
rate in cases overall. This is summarized in Panel B of Table B12 in 
Appendix B.  
I also compared the assignment of both federal criminal appeals and 
Guidelines cases to Judge Breyer when Judge Breyer was the only 
Democrat appointee on the panel, and whether there was another former 
prosecutor on the panel.194 Neither of these factors had any statistically 
significant effect on the disproportionate rate at which Judge Breyer 
was assigned federal criminal appeals and Guidelines cases.  
I tested the statistical significance of the predominant assignment of 
opinions to former bankruptcy judges using a binomial test. The results, 
set forth in Table B13 in Appendix B, make clear that former 
bankruptcy judges have received opinion assignments in bankruptcy 
cases in excess of the 33.33% of the time that would be expected if 
opinion assignment were random. The results are highly statistically 
significant for opinion assignment on the First, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits, and across the circuits cumulatively, surveying the First, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.195  
Because of the presence (for at least part of the time under study) of 
two former bankruptcy judges on its bench, the Sixth Circuit results are 
more complicated. Table B14 in Appendix B presents results when we 
consider the judges separately and counts all cases where that judge was 
in the majority. This count includes cases where both former bankruptcy 
judges, Judge Batchelder and Judge Cole, were part of the majority 
coalition; Judge Cole received the opinion assignment in all 4 of these 
cases. Judge Cole’s assignment rate is different, with statistical 
significance, from what one would expect under random assignment; 
Judge Batchelder’s rate was not statistically significant, though it 
approaches significance at the 10% level.196  
The results are slightly different if we continue to consider the 
judges separately but count only those cases where one judge, and not 
the other, was in the majority—if we eliminate from both tallies, the 4 
cases where both judges were part of the majority. (It may make sense 
to count this way in order to avoid cases where former bankruptcy 
judges have a cumulative two-thirds chance of receiving the opinion 
assignment.) As Table B15 in Appendix B indicates, Judge Batchelder’s 
number after this adjustment is significant at the 10% level, while Judge 
                                                                                                                     
 194. Another plausible control variable—whether or not there was a current district judge 
or a former district judge on the panel—was positive in every case in the dataset. And only two 
of the 164 cases were unpublished.  
 195. See infra Appendix B, Table B13.  
 196. See infra Appendix B, Table B14.  
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Cole—having lost 4 opinion assignments—now only approaches 
significance at that level.197  
Finally, we may tally the results across the Sixth Circuit in two 
ways. First, we include all cases in the dataset; this is reflected in the 
top row of Table B16 in Appendix B. The bottom row excludes the 4 
cases where both former bankruptcy judges were part of the majority 
coalition.198 The results are statistically significant either way.  
When we aggregate all the cases across circuits, the predominant 
assignment of cases to former bankruptcy judges differs, with statistical 
significance, from what we would expect were random assignment at 
work. This is shown in the last row of Table B13 in Appendix B. In 
short, while the picture in the Sixth Circuit is not as clear, still the 
overall bankruptcy data provide substantial support for Hypothesis 1, as 
do the Guidelines data.  
2.  Hypothesis 2—Effect of Introduction of Guidelines  
on Assignment of Opinions 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the heightened levels of opinion 
assignment to a judge with expertise in the relevant area are a result of 
that judge having that expertise. In other words, Hypothesis 2 suggests 
that, if we could somehow observe a version of the judge without that 
expertise but the same in all other respects, we would not observe 
heightened levels of opinion assignment. Ordinarily it is not possible to 
observe two versions of the same judge—one with relevant expertise 
and the other without. In the setting of the assignment of federal 
criminal appeals to the Sentencing Commissioner, however, we do have 
such an opportunity. I previously found evidence of disproportionate 
opinion assignment to both Judges Wilkins and Breyer. I now 
investigate whether that disparity existed in the assignment of federal 
criminal cases prior to the advent of the Guidelines. I do this by 
examining a time period before the application of the Guidelines, at 
which point Guidelines expertise would have been rather useless for 
court cases. For comparison with post-Guidelines assignment rates, I 
rely upon the year 1988 (bearing in mind that the Guidelines did not 
take effect until Nov. 1, 1987, and no Guidelines cases reached the 
Fourth Circuit until 1989). Again, I used two searches in the FCJ-CS 
library to find all appeals from federal convictions in which Judge 
Wilkins participated as a panel member.199 Where he sat on the panel, 
                                                                                                                     
 197. See infra Appendix B, Table B15.  
 198. See infra Appendix B, Table B16.  
 199. Both searches were conducted in FCJ-CS. The first search was: pr(“fourth circuit”) & 
wilkins & da(1988) % curiam. It yielded 13 federal criminal appeals heard by three-judge panels 
that included Judge Wilkins. Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion in 5 of those cases.  
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Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion in 6 of the 14 federal criminal appeals 
(42.86%) where he sat on the panel that were decided in 1988.200 I note 
that this rate is substantially below the comparable rate of 41 of 69 cases 
(59.42%) during the period 1990–1993.201  
I then used two searches to identify all Fourth Circuit cases decided 
by signed opinion in 1988 (in all subject-matter areas) where Judge 
Wilkins sat on the panel.202 A Fisher’s exact test (with results 
summarized in Table B17 in Appendix B) confirms that, unlike the 
result in 1991 (presented in Panel A of Table B11 in Appendix B), the 
rate at which Judge Wilkins was assigned opinions in federal criminal 
cases was not different, with statistical significance, from the overall 
rate at which he was assigned opinions.203 (Here, as above, I include all 
cases where Judge Wilkins was on the panel, whether or not he was part 
of the majority coalition.) This provides strong support for Hypothesis 
2.  
I similarly test whether the heightened assignment of federal 
criminal opinions to Judge Breyer is an artifact of the advent of the 
Guidelines. For comparison with post-Guidelines assignment rates, I 
again rely upon the year 1988. Again, I used two searches in the FCJ-
CS library to find all appeals from federal convictions in which Judge 
Breyer participated as a panel member.204 Judge Breyer wrote the 
opinion in 8 of the 32 signed federal criminal appeals (25.00%) where 
he sat on the panel that were decided in 1988.205 I note that this rate is 
substantially below the comparable rate of 61 out of 164 cases (37.20%) 
for the period 1990–1993.206  
I then searched for all First Circuit cases (in all subject-matter areas) 
decided by signed opinion in 1988 where Judge Breyer sat on the 
                                                                                                                     
The second search was: pr(“fourth circuit”) & da(1988) & wilkins & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.” 
“f.2d”. It yielded 1 case. Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion in that case.  
 200. See infra Appendix B, Table B17.  
 201. See infra Appendix B, Table B2.  
 202. Both searches were conducted in CTA4. The first search was: da(1988) & wilkins % 
curiam. It produced 72 cases. Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion in 21 of those cases.  
The second search was: da(1988) & wilkins & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d”. It yielded 3 
cases. Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion in 2 of those cases. 
 203. See infra Appendix B, Table B17.  
 204. Both searches were conducted in FCJ-CS. The first search was: pr(“first circuit”) & 
breyer & da(1988) % curiam. It yielded 28 cases. Judge Breyer wrote the opinion in 7 of those 
cases.  
The second search was: pr(“first circuit”) & da(1988) & breyer & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.” 
“f.2d”. It yielded 4 federal criminal cases that produced signed opinions; 1 was authored by 
Judge Breyer.  
 205. See infra Appendix B, Table B18.  
 206. See infra Appendix B, Table B4.  
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panel.207 A chi-squared test (with results summarized in Table B18 in 
Appendix B) confirms that Judge Breyer was not assigned opinions in 
federal criminal cases at a rate that differed, with statistical significance, 
from his overall assignment rate. This result differs substantially from 
the analogous and statistically significant result obtained from 1991 (see 
Panel A of Table B12), and thus provides support for Hypothesis 2.  
3.  Hypothesis 3—Effect of Extent of Legal Issues Raising Expertise on 
Assignment of Opinions 
Having found evidence of disproportionate opinion assignment to 
judges with relevant expertise in both the Guidelines and bankruptcy 
arenas, I turn to the question of whether that disparity grows when the 
number of legal issues going to a judge’s expertise, and the ratio of such 
legal issues to total issues in a case, gets larger. I look for statistical 
significance in the rate at which cases are assigned to the expert judge 
based upon the ratio of headnotes that correspond with the expert’s field 
to those that do not—that is, Guidelines headnotes ratio or Bankruptcy 
headnote ratio, as the case may be.208 In all settings, I group cases by 
whether the relevant headnote ratio is (i) less than or equal to one-third, 
(ii) greater than one-third but less than or equal to two-thirds, or 
(iii) greater than two-thirds. 
Two of the three datasets provide support for Hypothesis 3. The 
Wilkins dataset provides the weakest support. As summarized in Table 
B19 in Appendix B, 8 of 9 cases (88.9%) with a Guidelines headnote 
ratio of one-third or less, 6 of 8 cases (75.0%) with a ratio of more than 
one-third and two-thirds or less, and 16 of 25 (64.0%) cases with a ratio 
in excess of two-thirds were assigned to Judge Wilkins. There is no 
statistically significant difference in the assignment rate. 
The Breyer dataset tells a different story. As summarized in Table 
B20 in Appendix B, while only 6 of 20 cases (30.0%) with a Guidelines 
headnote ratio of one-third or less and 8 of 22 cases (36.4%) with a ratio 
of more than one-third and two-thirds or less were assigned to Judge 
Breyer, 20 of 33 (60.6%) cases with a ratio in excess of two-thirds were 
assigned to Judge Breyer. The difference in assignment rate is 
statistically significant.  
The results for the bankruptcy datasets, presented in Table B21 in 
Appendix B, also support Hypothesis 3. While only 20 of 57 cases 
                                                                                                                     
 207. Both searches were conducted in CTA1. The first search was: da(1988) & breyer % 
curiam. It produced 102 cases. Judge Breyer wrote the opinion in 33 of those cases.  
The second search was: da(1988) & breyer & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d”. It yielded 17 
cases; Judge Breyer wrote the opinion in 4 of those cases.  
 208. West provides headnotes for all published decisions, and in recent years for some 
unpublished decisions as well.  
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(35.1%) with a Bankruptcy headnote ratio of one-third or less were 
assigned to former bankruptcy judges, 28 of 50 cases (56.0%) with a 
ratio of more than one-third and up to two-thirds were assigned to 
expert judges, and 135 of 238 cases (56.7%) with a ratio of more than 
two-thirds wind up in the hands of experts. Again, the difference is 
statistically significant. 
Overall, then, the data indicate substantial, but not unequivocal, 
support for Hypothesis 3.  
4.  Hypothesis 4—Party Affiliation and Assignment of Opinions 
I turn now to examine the effect of party affiliation on opinion 
assignment. In the context of the Guidelines cases, I perform the 
empirical testing solely on the Wilkins data because Judge Breyer was 
Chief Judge in nearly all the cases in the Breyer database and therefore 
was responsible for nearly all opinion assignments. The results are 
presented in Table B22 in Appendix B. For both federal criminal cases 
and Guidelines cases, assignment rates remain, with statistical 
significance, similarly disproportionate.209 In addition, there is no 
statistical significance between the rate at which judges appointed by 
Democratic presidents, as opposed to judges appointed by Republican 
presidents, assign opinions to Judge Wilkins.210 Thus, as the theory 
predicts, the null hypothesis—that opinion assignment rates do not vary 
with statistical significance depending upon whether the assigning judge 
was appointed by a Democratic or Republican president—cannot be 
rejected.  
The results for the combined bankruptcy dataset are presented in 
Table B23 in Appendix B. Again, in any setting, the null hypothesis—
that opinion assignment rates do not vary with statistical significance 
depending upon whether the assigning judge was appointed by a 
Democratic or Republican president—cannot be rejected. Assignment 
rates generally remain disproportionate regardless of whether a 
Democratic or Republican appointee has opinion assignment 
responsibility.  
Notably, all but one of the judges under study—Judge Cole—were 
appointed by Republican presidents. To gain further insight into the role 
of party affiliation, I reverse the “polarity” of Judge Cole’s assignors 
and ask not whether an assignor was appointed by a Democratic or 
Republican president, but whether the assignor was appointed by a 
judge who was appointed by a president of the same party as the 
president who appointed the former bankruptcy judge to the circuit. 
                                                                                                                     
 209. See infra Appendix B, Table B22.  
 210. Id.  
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Across all circuits, former bankruptcy judges author 54 of 105 opinions 
(51.43%) where the assigning judge was appointed by a president 
different from the party of the president who appointed the authoring 
judge, and 129 of 240 opinions (53.75%) in cases where the assigning 
judge was appointed by a president different from the party of the 
president who appointed the authoring judge. The results still do not 
divulge any statistically significant difference in opinion assignment 
rates.211  
In summary, the results yielded do not refute Hypothesis 4. 
5.  Hypothesis 5—Assignment of Cases and Judicial Panel Rank 
The final hypothesis suggests that the hierarchical position, within 
the majority coalition, of a judge with relevant expertise should not 
substantially affect opinion assignment rates. I test the hypothesis in the 
context of the Wilkins dataset212 and the bankruptcy dataset. 
The results for the Wilkins dataset, broken down for federal criminal 
appeals and Guidelines cases, are presented in Table B24 in Appendix 
B. The rate at which Judge Wilkins self-assigns criminal appeals is 
exactly what one would expect in the abstract: one-third.213 This can be 
explained by the fact that judges may be more reluctant to self-assign.214 
Overall, moreover, Judge Wilkins receives opinion assignments in 
federal criminal appeals and Guidelines cases at rates different—with 
statistical significance—from the otherwise expected one-third 
regardless of hierarchical position, and the rates do not vary from one 
another, with statistical significance, depending upon hierarchical 
position.215 
The results for the bankruptcy dataset are presented in Table B25 in 
Appendix B.216 Consistent with the hypothesis, disproportionate opinion 
assignment persists, for the most part, regardless of the hierarchical 
position of the expert judge. Moreover, we are again unable, in any 
setting, to reject the null hypothesis that opinion assignment rates do not 
vary with a former bankruptcy judge’s hierarchical position on a 
judicial panel.  
In short, the support for Hypothesis 5 is fairly strong.  
                                                                                                                     
 211. Chi-squared test p = 0.691. 
 212. Because Judge Breyer was Chief Judge for almost every case in the Breyer database, 
he was almost always the senior member of every panel.  
 213. See infra Appendix B, Table B24.  
 214. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
 215. See infra Appendix B, Table B24.  
 216. In the event that a judge in the senior-most or middle position on the panel was not 
part of the majority, I adjusted the rank of the other judges accordingly.  
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V.  DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The conclusions in the preceding Part provide support for the 
hypotheses laid out at the end of Part II. First, judges with expertise 
generally receive a disproportionate share of opinion assignments. 
Second, the natural experiment provided by the Guidelines allows us to 
conclude that acquiring relevant expertise does indeed result in more 
frequent opinion assignment. Third, the presence in a case of many 
issues going to a judge’s expertise—or the presence of a greater 
proportion of such issues to the total number of issues raised in the 
case—generally increases the likelihood that that judge will draft the 
opinion. Fourth, the ideological differences of the assigning judge and 
an expert judge generally do not reduce the disproportionate assignment 
of cases to the expert judge. And, fifth, expert judges receive 
disproportionately more opinion assignments regardless of the 
hierarchical position they fill on three-judge panels.  
The Sixth Circuit bankruptcy case data—and especially the data 
involving Judge Batchelder—are the most difficult for the theory. It 
bears emphasizing, as well, that the Sixth Circuit was the one court that 
empirical testing seemed to suggest might not have been randomly 
assigning bankruptcy opinions.217 However, it is also important to bear 
in mind that, if the Sixth Circuit were using nonrandom assignment to 
channel more bankruptcy cases to panels where a former bankruptcy 
judge could author the opinion, then one would expect the proportion of 
opinions in such bankruptcy cases authored by former bankruptcy 
judges to be higher than the expected one-third. Yet the data indicate 
that the proportion is sometimes not significantly different from one-
third. This suggests that, if there is nonrandom assignment of cases, it is 
not done to allow more opinion-writing by expert judges.  
Despite the general support for the notion that judges with expertise 
receive heightened levels of opinion assignment, the data show that 
there is considerable heterogeneity across circuits and judges in the 
treatment of expert judges. In the bankruptcy context, Judge Cyr authors 
a far greater percentage of bankruptcy case opinions than does any other 
former bankruptcy judge.218 Perhaps this is because Judge Cyr’s 
expertise outstrips the other former bankruptcy judges’ expertise in 
unique and valuable ways. Even before serving as a bankruptcy judge, 
                                                                                                                     
 217. See discussion supra Subsection IV.A.3. The Sixth Circuit has not been immune from 
controversy regarding random assignment of cases to panels in recent years. See Tracey E. 
George & Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal Theory and Possible Paradox 
of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2008) (noting the Sixth Circuit controversy 
surrounding allegations that the chief judge manipulated the assignment process and deviated 
from random assignment). 
 218. See infra Appendix B, Table B23.  
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Judge Cyr served as a bankruptcy referee under the old pre-Bankruptcy 
Code “Bankruptcy Act of 1898” era.219 In addition, he served as chief 
judge of the original First Circuit BAP.220 No other bankruptcy judge 
later elevated to the circuit can lay claim to anything approaching that 
level of experience.  
In the Guidelines context, the expertise that Judge Wilkins and Judge 
Breyer both enjoyed seems to manifest itself in terms of opinion 
assignment in slightly different ways. As borne out by both binomial 
and chi-squared tests, Judge Wilkins received a statistically 
disproportionate number of opinions in federal criminal cases, and even 
more so in Guidelines cases when he sat on the panel in such cases.221 
With respect to Judge Breyer, the binomial test did not indicate that the 
higher assignment rate in federal criminal cases was statistically 
significant.222 However, the chi-squared test did find statistical 
significance, and both the binomial and chi-squared tests confirm the 
statistical significance of the disproportionate rate at which Judge 
Breyer was assigned opinions in Guidelines cases.223 With respect to 
both federal criminal and Guidelines cases, Judge Wilkins received a 
higher proportion of opinion assignments than did Judge Breyer.224  
This result is broadly consistent with Judge Wilkins’s more 
extensive experience in general criminal law. As a Commissioner who 
participated in the drafting of the original Guidelines, Judge Breyer also 
had experience that few other judges could claim. At the same time, 
there are reasons to temper, at least as compared to Judge Wilkins, our 
expectations about the frequency of opinion assignment to Judge 
Breyer. For one thing, during the entire period of the study, Judge 
Breyer was the chief judge of the First Circuit. That means that, in every 
case, he held the prerogative to assign opinions. As chief judge, Judge 
Breyer may have been concerned about the appearance of assigning too 
many opinions in an area to himself, and also about the effect of such 
self-assignment on the court’s legitimacy. Second, Judge Breyer does 
not have as strong a background in criminal law as does Judge 
Wilkins.225 Rather, Judge Breyer seems to have brought an 
                                                                                                                     
 219. See Judge Cyr Biography, supra note 155.  
 220. See id.; supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting Judge Cyr served as chief 
judge of the original First Circuit BAP).  
 221. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.1.  
 222. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.1.  
 223. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.1.  
 224. See infra Appendix B, Tables B2–B5.  
 225. As noted above, Judge Breyer served briefly as counsel in the Watergate prosecutions, 
but this pales in comparison to Judge Wilkins’s extensive experience in criminal law before 
ascending to the bench.  
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administrative law expertise to bear on the Guidelines.226 But many 
Guidelines cases are likely also to raise unrelated issues of criminal law. 
Judge Breyer’s lack of a general criminal law expertise might have 
deterred him from taking on such cases, for fear that expertise that 
would help him deal with part of the case would not help him with the 
rest of the case at all;227 the efficiency benefit would indeed be limited. 
In the end, then, that Judge Breyer’s expertise was restricted more to the 
Guidelines squares nicely with Judge Breyer being assigned opinions at 
a lower rate than Judge Wilkins, and also with his being more likely to 
write the opinion in cases with larger proportions of Guidelines 
headnotes.  
The validation of the various hypotheses offers strong support for the 
theoretical explanation for expertise-based opinion assignment 
advanced in Parts I and II. No alternate explanation satisfies all the 
observations here as well as the proffered theory does. For example, one 
might suggest that the high rate of assignment of opinions in Guidelines 
appeals to Judge Wilkins is in part due to Judge Wilkins’s prosecutorial 
experience.228 Two points belie this explanation. First, the data do not 
suggest that district judges who had prosecutorial experience were 
substantially more likely to be assigned Guidelines opinions. Second, 
the power of this explanation is undercut by the comparatively low rate 
at which Judge Wilkins was assigned criminal cases before the advent 
of the Guidelines,229 despite the prosecutorial experience he had, even 
then.  
With respect to Judge Breyer, one might turn to Professor Tracey 
George’s scholarship finding that circuit judges with prior legal 
academic experience tend to be assigned more cases than their 
colleagues.230 But the suggestion that this explains the higher rates at 
which Judge Breyer is assigned Guidelines cases is undercut231 by both 
                                                                                                                     
 226. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting Justice Breyer’s expertise in 
administrative law).  
 227. See supra Subsection II.B.2.b (arguing that expertise is more valuable when it arises 
in a case where it can be used to dispose of all the issues in the case).  
 228. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting Judge Wilkins’s experience as 
solicitor in South Carolina). Judge M. Blane Michael also had such experience, but was 
appointed to the Fourth Circuit only at the tail end of the time period studied. See Biographical 
Directory of Federal Judges: Michael, M. Blane, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/
nGetInfo?jid=1632&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Aug. 26, 2014) (noting that 
Judge Michael began serving on the Fourth Circuit in 1993). 
 229. See infra Appendix B, Table B17.  
 230. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 41–42, 50–54 (2001) 
(contending legal academics’ “individualistic approach to judging should increase their 
inclination to write signed, published opinions”). 
 231. Also suggestive that it is Judge Breyer’s Sentencing Commission experience, and not 
his academic experience, that explains the results here is the finding that a judge’s prior 
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(i) the fact that the study here looked at proportions of cases in which 
opinions were assigned, not absolute numbers; and (ii) the fact that the 
rate at which Judge Breyer was assigned opinions in federal criminal 
cases increased once the Guidelines were effective.232  
One might argue that expert judges penned large numbers of cases in 
their areas of expertise not because of expertise in the area, but because 
of plain interest in the area (perhaps combined with other judges’ lack 
of interest in the area).233 While this explanation may have some 
validity, it leaves open the question as to why, for example, other judges 
with prosecutorial experience would not have similar interest in 
handling Guidelines cases. It is also hard to believe that assigning 
judges, even if they did “award” cases to satisfy certain judges’ 
“interests,” did not take into account the potential benefits from having 
experts draft opinions.  
The results here have implications for other scholarship on 
specialization and opinion assignment, and on judicial review of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. First, the high rate at which Judge Wilkins was 
assigned opinions in federal criminal cases is consistent with Professor 
Cheng’s finding about Judge Wilkins’ strong specialization in criminal 
law cases.234 Indeed, Professor Cheng’s measure of Judge Wilkins’ 
affinity for federal criminal cases was the highest among all circuit 
judges for any subject in his study.235 However, the findings here draw 
into question whether a similar study conducted before the Guidelines 
took effect (Professor Cheng’s study spanned the years 1995–2005) 
would have produced a similar result.  
Second, that the data here indicate that political affiliations did not 
play a significant role in opinion assignment in Guidelines cases draws 
into question the need to ensure partisan balance in Guidelines cases. 
Based upon their finding that district judges tend to apply their 
                                                                                                                     
experience as a law professor was not likely to affect how she ruled on the constitutionality of 
the Guidelines pre-Mistretta. Sisk et al., supra note 114, at 1479–80. Extrapolating from this, it 
seems unlikely that Judge Breyer, as a former law professor, assigned Guidelines opinions to 
himself in order to secure particular policy outcomes.  
 232. With respect to Judge Breyer, at least some of this effect may be because only after 
the Guidelines took effect was Judge Breyer the chief judge, and thus empowered to assign the 
opinion in every case in which he participated.  
 233. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 527 (“[T]he assigning judge may distribute opinions 
based on the panel members’ special expertise or interest.” (emphasis added)).  
 234. See id. at 541 (noting Judge Wilkins’s “overwhelming” number of criminal and 
postconviction opinions).  
 235. See id. at 564 (providing empirical data demonstrating that Judge Wilkins’s 
specialization rate vis-à-vis other judges). Judge Posner received a higher absolute score for 
criminal law, but that score was negative in sign, which indicated Judge Posner’s aversion to 
criminal law cases. See id. at 565.  
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discretion under the Guidelines with an eye to the ideology of the circuit 
to which their decision would be appealed,236 Professors Max 
Schanzenbach and Emerson Tiller suggest institutionalizing ideological 
diversity “for every sentencing event by ensuring that for any criminal 
sentencing the lower court and higher court not share a uniform political 
(partisan) orientation.”237 To be sure, the instant study looks at opinion 
assignment in Guidelines cases, not the extent to which voting is 
ideological. In addition, the study here looks at the time period largely 
before the time period that Professors Schanzenbach and Tiller studied, 
a time period that includes years that they do not study because of the 
large technical issues that remained outstanding.238 Still, the findings 
here certainly do not provide any additional reason to believe that it is 
important to mandate partisan balance in Guidelines cases.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article provides a theory for expertise-based assignment of 
judicial opinions. It has tested that theory, with success, in the context 
of the assignment of federal criminal and Sentencing Guidelines cases 
to expert judges who drafted those Guidelines, and also in the context of 
the assignment of bankruptcy cases to judges who previously served as 
federal bankruptcy judges.  
In future research, I plan to expand this research in three ways. First, 
I hope to investigate additional observable implications of the expertise-
based theory of opinion assignment advanced here. For example, the 
theory predicts that the court will garner reputation benefits through the 
assignment of opinions in that area to experts. One way that reputation 
benefit might manifest itself is through citation of those expertly drafted 
opinions by other courts. Indeed, David Klein and Darby Morrisroe 
have found that Judge Wilkins’s and, to a lesser extent, Judge Breyer’s 
opinions are cited rather extensively, and they speculate that this is the 
result of the judges’ Guidelines experience.239 I hope to investigate the 
issue more methodically, with an eye to the reputation theory 
enunciated here. I also hope to look at judicial citations of other writings 
by these judges—writings other than opinions—in the area of the 
Guidelines.  
Second, I plan to further test the theory in other settings. It would be 
interesting, in particular, to investigate settings where expertise-based 
                                                                                                                     
 236. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 32–33.  
 237. Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 113, at 744–45.  
 238. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 35 (“We begin with 1992 because the 
Guidelines were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1989 and the permissibility of certain grounds 
for departures became clearer in the early 1990s.”).  
 239. See Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 2, at 381–82.  
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assignment might compete more directly with ideological interests. 
Finally, the theory of expertise-based opinion assignment advanced 
here is but the first step in a broader theoretical understanding of the 
factors that influence judicial opinion assignment. I plan to advance 
such an understanding in future work.  
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APPENDIX A: A FORMAL UTILITY-BASED MODEL OF OPINION 
ASSIGNMENT 
A.  The Basic Model  
I develop a utility-based model of opinion assignment. I begin with a 
simple court that hears a case en banc, and has an exogenous 
determination as to who drafts the opinion in the case. I build up to a 
court that has a docket of cases, and a generalized rule for determining 
who enjoys the prerogative to assign responsibility for drafting the 
opinion in each case. I also allow for courts that hear cases in panels 
consisting of less than the entire complement of judges. Where a docket 
of cases is to be assigned, I assume a court norm that expects each to 
draft roughly the same number of opinions. 
 
Consider a court C. Let J denote the set of m judges who sit on C;  
 
J = { j1, j2, j3, . . . , jm}. 
  
Let us begin with a very basic example: The court, which hears all 
cases en banc, has heard a case c. One of the judges—say j*—will write 
the opinion in the case. Each judge brings different experiential and 
ideological backgrounds to the table. Accordingly, depending on which 
judge drafts the opinion in c, the opinion will offer varying costs and 
benefits—in terms of the time it takes to prepare the opinion, legal 
legitimacy and reputation, and ideological legitimacy and reputation—
to the court. 
The time it takes the authoring judge to prepare the opinion imposes 
a cost on the court by depleting its limited resources. The time will be a 
function of the authoring judge: t(j*).  
The time that a judge spends drafting an opinion is an expenditure of 
a resource. Presumably, the court hopes to recoup something for that 
investment (or at least minimize any loss) by virtue of the quality of the 
resulting opinion. An opinion may inure to a court’s benefit by 
emphasizing the court’s legal acumen and skill; it may also inure to the 
court’s benefit by emphasizing the court’s ideological stance. 
Let the legal value benefits offered by judge j* drafting the opinion 
in case c be represented by L(j*). Let the ideological value benefits 
offered by judge j* drafting the opinion in case c be represented by I(j*).  
Now let us consider the utility that a judge—say without loss of 
generality j1—gets from having j* author the opinion in c. This utility 
will include a combination of these five values. Each judge, however, is 
likely to weigh the factors differently. Accordingly, for judge j1, the 
utility of having judge j* draft the opinion will depend upon 
  
65
Nash: Expertise and Opinion Assignment on the Courts of Appeals: A Prel
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1664 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
 -γ1(j1)t(j*) + γ2(j1)L(j*) + γ3(j1)I(j*), 
 
where γ1, γ2, and γ3 measure the relative weights that j1 assigns to each 
cost/benefit with respect to case c.  
Beyond this, j1’s own utility arising directly from j*’s authorship 
aside, j1 may be concerned about how judges other than judge j1 
(including j*240) will react to j*’s authorship. Having judge j* write the 
opinion in c will provide utility of various levels to the various judges 
on the court. The judges may have a view on whether the associated 
costs and benefits are desirable. And, quite apart from that, they may 
have a view on whether j* is happy writing the opinion and on whether 
they would have preferred writing the opinion themselves. Call this 
utility s; s is also a function of j*, as well as of j1: s(j1, j*). There is also a 
weight, γ4, that j1 attaches to that factor. 
Then the utility drawn by j1 from having j* author the opinion in case 
c is 
  
u(j1, j*) = -γ1(j1)t(j*) + γ2(j1)L(j*) + γ3(j1)I(j*) + γ4s(j1, j*). 
 
More generally, for any judge jk and j* (both elements of J),  
  
u(jk, j*) = -γ1t(j*) + γ2L(j*) + γ3I(j*) + γ4s(jk, j*). 
 
The various weighting factors γr are functions of jk. 
 
Now say that the court considers two cases c1 and c2. Now the γr are 
functions not only of jk, but also of the case: 
 





u(c2, jk, j*) = -γ1(c2, jk)t(j*) + γ2(c2, jk)L(j*) + γ3(c2, jk)I(j*) + γ4s(c2, jk, 
j*). 
  
More generally, say now that the court has a docket of n cases. Let D 
represent C’s docket—that is, the set of n cases currently pending 
before C; D = {c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn}. Then: 
 
                                                                                                                     
 240. Judge j* could be pleased with receiving the opinion assignment in the case, or she 
might prefer it if another judge had gotten the task. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.  
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u(ci, jk, j*) = -γ1(ci, jk)t(j*) + γ2(ci, jk)L(j*) + γ3(ci, jk)I(j*) + γ4s(ci, jk, j*) 
  
We may imagine an “assignment function” that maps uniquely from 
D to J. A: D → J. A maps each case ci to the judge—say j*–who will 
write the opinion in ci: A(ci) = j*. Then, from the perspective of judge jk, 






U(jk) = u(ci, jk, A(ci)) 
   
If judge jk is the assigning judge for all cases ci 0 D, then jk should 
assign cases—and in so doing define the function A—such that her 
utility is maximized. However, she must do so subject to the 
institutional constraint of approximate parity in number of cases 
assigned to each judge. Let A-1 be the inverse of the assignment function 
A. Then A-1(jl) represents the set of all cases for which the assignment 
function A assigns to judge jl to write the opinion. The institutional 
constraint is that each judge must bear responsibility for approximately 
the same number of opinions, i.e., that | A-1(ji)| ≈ n/m.  
Now say that responsibility for opinion assignment is not vested in a 
single judge jk. For example, on many courts—including the Supreme 
Court—responsibility for opinion assignment lies with the senior 
ranking judge who belongs to the majority coalition, with the chief 
judge having the highest rank by virtue of that position. Let R be the 
function that determines the right to assign the opinion-writing 
responsibility in all cases. Like A, R: D → J. For any case ci, R returns 
the judge, say j’, who has the power to choose who drafts the opinion in 
ci.  
I assume, as it is almost universally the case, that the function R is 
set by court rule, and therefore for model purposes is exogenously 
given. Because the function R determines who assigns responsibility for 
drafting opinions in all cases on the court’s docket, it in effect 
determines the assignment function A. A couple of examples will 
illustrate the point.  
For the Supreme Court, opinion assignment rests with the senior-
most Justice in the majority coalition—with the Chief Justice de facto 
the senior-most Justice whenever he or she is part of that coalition.241 
Practically, then, responsibility for the assignment of drafting the 
opinion in most cases falls to one of two Justices—the Chief Justice and 
                                                                                                                     
 241. See SEGAL & SPAETHsupra note 1, at 368 (discussing the Supreme Court opinion 
assignment process).  
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next-most-senior (or maybe most senior of the opposition bloc). For 
simplicity, we may initially assume that assignment falls just to two 
judges—j1 and j2. Let R-1(jk) denote the set of all cases ci 0 D, such that 
R(ci) = jk. Then j1 and j2 together determine the assignment function A. 




u(ci, j1, A(ci)). 
 
And Judge j2 will define “her part” of the utility function so as to 
maximize 
max Σ  
ci 0 R-1(j2)
u(ci, j2, A(ci)). 
Both judges’ assignments remain subject to the overall approximate 
parity constraint. 
More generally, say that more than two judges are responsible for 
assigning opinion drafting responsibilities for cases on the docket. Let r 
denote that subset of judges who enjoy opinion assignment 
responsibility with respect to at least one case on the docket, i.e., r f J 
such that jk 0 r ? jk 0 R(D).  
Then each judge in r will assign cases—and thus define the overall 
assignment function A—so as to maximize his utility under “his 
portion” of the assignment function. In other words, the assignment 
function will be defined—subject to institutional constraint—as the 
function that achieves the following maxima:  
 
max 
jk 0 r Σ  ci 0 R-1(jk)
u(ci, jk, A(ci)), 
   
 
or in expanded form, 
 
max 









To this point, I have assumed that the court C hears all cases en 
banc. In fact, many courts—including federal courts of appeals—hear 
cases in panels.242 Introducing panels to the model is not overly 
                                                                                                                     
 242. See Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, Local Control of the Bureaucracy: Federal 
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complicated. The determination of the assignment function A works 
substantially as above, and relies upon the same maximization 
requirements.243 
B.  Opinion Assignment and Case Type 
Now let us think about categories of cases, and how they might 
impact the maximization requirements that define the assignment 
function. Ideological cases are likely to produce values of the various 
weighting factors (the γr) that vary greatly across judges. Ideologically 
minded judges will be likely to weight the ideological value factor 
heavily—although whether a judge weights these factors positively or 
negatively will depend upon whether the judge is of like, or opposite, 
ideology to the authoring judge. Also, there may be judges who tend to 
be less ideological, and to believe that cases (even ideologically charged 
ones) ought to be decided in accord with the rule of law. These judges 
may assign comparatively little weight to the ideological factor, and 
instead may give more weight to the legal factor. These differences will, 
in turn, also feed vastly different values for s—the feelings of the other 
judges on the court. 
In contrast, one can rationally expect the weighting of factors to be 
more uniform across judges with respect to nonideological cases—i.e., 
cases in nonideological areas that do not raise salient issues. Here, even 
ideological judges are likely to weight the ideological factor far less 
than they do the legal factor. In addition, to the extent that the legal 
factor dominates, it seems that these cases will appeal to judges of all 
stripes as cases that ought to be decided with common weight for the 
legal factor. (Indeed, even if judges disagree as to the outcome that “the 
law” dictates or suggests, they are still likely to agree that the case 
should be decided in accordance with governing law.) As a simplifying 
                                                                                                                     
Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue Service, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 233, 
242–43 (2003) (“[F]ederal courts of appeals typically hear cases in randomly assigned three-
judge panels.”).  
 243. Consider federal courts of appeals that typically hear cases in panels of three judges 
who are selected at random. The function P maps cases onto J x J x J: P(ci) = {P1(ci), P2(ci), 
P3(ci)}. One judge on the panel—usually the senior-most judge (with the chief judge de facto 
having the most seniority if he or she is on the panel)—assigns the opinion, and the recipient 
must be a panel member. Thus, R and A now map not from D → J, but from  
D → c  P(ci). 
ci 0 D  
The same maximization conditions define the assignment function A as in the non-panel setting. 
Once again, r is the set of judges who enjoy opinion assignment responsibility in at least one 
case on the court’s docket, and R-1(jk) is the set of all cases as to which judge jk enjoys such 
responsibility.  
69
Nash: Expertise and Opinion Assignment on the Courts of Appeals: A Prel
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
1668 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
assumption, I assume that, at least in cases that fall squarely within this 
category, the weight of the ideological factor—γ3—will be zero. I also 
assume that the weight of time taken to draft the opinion in the case and 
the weight of the legal factor—γ1 and γ2—will be substantially the same 
across judges. Finally, I assume—again unlike for ideological cases—
that s will also be uniform across all judges, i.e., that, insofar as feelings 
about authorship are likely to be largely homogenous, so too will be the 
value of judges’ reactions to having a particular judge author the 
opinion in the case.  
C.  Opinion Assignment in Nonideological Cases on Error-
Correcting Courts 
There are several aspects of condition (1) that likely will hold when 
an error-correcting court decides a predominantly nonideological case. I 
make several simplifying assumptions to allow conclusions to be more 
easily drawn.  
First, there is a strong likelihood that γ3—the weight judges assign to 
ideological benefit—will be very small. I assume it will be zero. 
Second, the weights judges assign to the time it takes to draft an 
opinion and to the legal benefit an opinion will offer—γ1 and γ2—will 
likely be largely uniform across assigning judges, at least with respect 
to categories of like cases. I assume that they will be the same, i.e., that 
they will be constants. 
Last, it will also likely be the case that s—the aggregate utility of the 
judges other than the assigning judge—will not vary substantially. I 
assume that it will not vary at all. Thus, even if different assigning 
judges weight other judges’ utility differently, i.e., have different values 
for γ4, the product γ4(c1, jk)s(c1, jk, j*) will be constant for any given 
assigning judge jk and cases within a category.  It will not matter which 
judge receives the opinion assignment.244 
These conclusions—as amplified by the simplifying assumptions—
allow a reduction in the maxima requirement (1) that defines the court’s 
assignment function in these cases thus:  
 
max 
jk 0 r´ 
Σ 
ci 0 R-1(jk) 
 
-K1t(A(ci)) + K2L(A(ci)) + K3, 
 
where K1, K2, and K3 are constants, and r´ is the set of judges who 
assign the opinion in all nonideological cases. The institutional parity-
                                                                                                                     
 244. One exception to this might arise if the judge to whom a certain kind of case would 
tend to be assigned is also the assigning judge—for example, if the judge with expertise in a 
relevant area is also the chief judge, and therefore always enjoys the opinion-assignment 
prerogative. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
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of-opinion-assignment requirement continues to apply. 
If that is true, then a choice by jk to assign case ci to judge j* that 
tends both to make t(j*) very small and also to make L(j*) very large will 
contribute toward achieving the desired maximum. As explained in 
Section II.A, expertise-based opinion assignment will fit this bill.  
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APPENDIX B: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Note: For all tables, * denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05, and 
*** denotes p < 0.01. 
TABLE B1: Circuit Judges with Prior Experience as Bankruptcy Judges 
Cir. Name of Judge 
Years in Service 
as Bankruptcy 
Judge 
Appointed to Court 
of Appeals by 
President 








1 Conrad K. Cyr 1973–1981245 G. H.W. Bush 11/20/1989–Present 1/31/1997 
6 Alice M. Batchelder 1983–1985246 G. H.W. Bush 12/2/1991–Present -- 
6 R. Guy Cole, Jr. 1987–1993247 W. Clinton 12/26/1995–Present -- 
6 Bernice B. Donald 1988–1995248 B. Obama 9/8/2011–Present -- 
8 Michael J. Melloy 1986–1992249 G.W. Bush 2/14/2002–Present -- 
10 John C. Porfilio 1975–1982250 R. Reagan 5/10/1985–Present 10/15/1999 
 
                                                                                                                     
 245. Judge Cyr’s years as a bankruptcy judge includes years—prior to the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Reform Act—when bankruptcy judges were called “bankruptcy referees.” During 1980 and 
1981, he also served as chief judge of the First Circuit’s bankruptcy appellate panel. See supra 
notes 219–220 and accompanying text. Judge Cyr also served as a federal district judge from 
1981 to 1989. See Judge Cyr Biography, supra note 155.  
 246. Judge Batchelder also served as a federal district judge from 1985 to 1992. 
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Batchelder, Alice Moore, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=116&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 
2, 2014).  
 247. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Cole, R[ansey] Guy Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=473&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 
2, 2014). 
 248. Judge Donald also served as a federal district judge from 1995 to 2011. Biographical 
Directory of Federal Judges: Donald, Bernice Bouie, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/
servlet/nGetInfo?jid=631&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).  
 249. Judge Melloy also served as a federal district judge from 1992 to 2002. Biographical 
Directory of Federal Judges: Melloy, Michael Joseph, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1616&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2014).  
 250. Judge Porfilio (then known as Judge Moore) also served as a federal district judge 
from 1982 to 1985. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Porfilio, John Carbone, FED. 
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1915&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2014).  
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TABLE B2: Federal Criminal Cases Where Judge Wilkins Was Part of 
the Majority, by Year 
Year Number of Cases 
Number (Percentage) of Opinions 
















TABLE B3: Sentencing Guidelines Cases Where Judge Wilkins Was 
Part of the Majority, by Year 
Year Number of Cases 
Number (Percentage) of Opinions 
















TABLE B4: Federal Criminal Cases Where Judge Breyer Was Part of 
the Majority, by Year 
Year Number of Cases 
Number (Percentage) of Opinions 
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TABLE B5: Sentencing Guidelines Cases Where Judge Breyer Was 
Part of the Majority, by Year 
Year Number of Cases 
Number (Percentage) of Opinions 
















TABLE B6: Summary of Data Collected in Primary Bankruptcy 
Databases 
Circuit Total Number of Cases 
Number (Percentage) of Cases in which a 
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1 6 6  8 10
 
  
                                                                                                                     
 251. I included as a non-senior judge Ralph Guy, who assumed senior status on September 
1, 1994. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Guy, Ralph B. Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=931&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 
2, 2014). 
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 252. I did not include Judge Niemeyer, who became a circuit judge on August 7, 1990. 
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Niemeyer, Paul Victor, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1766&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2014). 
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 253. Fisher’s exact test. 
 254. Fisher’s exact test. 
 255. Chi-squared test. 
 256. Fisher’s exact test. 
 257. Fisher’s exact test. 
 258. Fisher’s exact test. 
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TABLE B10: Results of Tests for Disproportionate Issuance of Per 
Curiam Opinions When Judge Wilkins Was on Panel 










Question is on 
Panel 
Number (%age) of 
Cases Where Judge 
in Question is on 



















TABLE B11: Assignment of All Fourth Circuit Cases Decided in 1991 
Where Judge Wilkins Was on the Panel 
Panel A: Comparing Federal Criminal Cases 
 Appeals from 
Federal Convictions 
Cases Other than Appeals 
from Federal Convictions Total 
Cases in which Judge 
Wilkins was assigned 
the opinion 11 11 22 
Cases in which Judge 
Wilkins was not 
assigned the opinion 6 25 31 
Total 17 36 53 
Chi-Square = 5.54 [p = 0.019].  
Panel B: Comparing Guidelines Cases 
 Guidelines Cases Non-Guidelines Cases Total 
Cases in which Judge 
Wilkins was assigned 
the opinion 
9 13 22 
Cases in which Judge 
Wilkins was not 
assigned the opinion 
3 28 31 
Total 12 41 53 
Chi-Square = 7.17 [p = 0.007].  
 
                                                                                                                     
 259. Chi-squared test. 
 260. Chi-squared test. 
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TABLE B12: Assignment of All First Circuit 
Opinions Decided in 1991 
Panel A: Comparing Federal Criminal Cases 
 
Appeals from Federal 
Convictions 
Cases Other than 
Appeals from Federal 
Convictions Total 
Cases in which Judge 
Breyer was assigned 
the opinion 22 21 43 
Cases in which Judge 
Breyer was not 
assigned the opinion 33 59 92 
Total 55 80 135 
Chi-Square = 2.84 [p = 0.092]. 
Panel B: Comparing Guidelines Cases 
 Guidelines Cases Non-Guidelines Cases Total 
Cases in which Judge 
Breyer was assigned 
the opinion 13 30 43 
Cases in which Judge 
Breyer was not 
assigned the opinion 11 81 92 
Total 24 111 135 
Chi-Square = 6.70 [p = 0.010]. 
TABLE B13: Assignment of Opinions to 
Former Bankruptcy Judges 
Circuit 
Total Number of 
Cases 
Number (Percentage) of 
Cases in which a Former 












(61.90) < 0.01*** 
10 139 
68 
(48.92) < 0.01*** 
Total 345 
183 
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TABLE B14: Assignment of Opinions to Former Bankruptcy Judges 
on the Sixth Circuit (counting any cases where at least one former 
bankruptcy judge Was in the majority) 
Judge 
Total Number of Cases 
Where Judge in Question 
Was the Lone Former 
Bankruptcy Judge 
Number (Percentage) of 
Cases in which the Judge 










TABLE B15: Assignment of Opinions to Former Bankruptcy Judges 
on the Sixth Circuit (counting any cases where at most one former 
bankruptcy judge was in the majority) 
Judge 
Total Number of Cases 
Where Judge in Question 
Was the Lone Former 
Bankruptcy Judge in the 
Majority 
Number (Percentage) of 
Cases in which the Judge 










TABLE B16: Assignment of Opinions to Former Bankruptcy Judges 
on the Sixth Circuit (Cumulative) 
Cases 
Included: 
Total Number of Cases 
Where Judge in Question 
Was the Lone Former 
Bankruptcy Judge in the 
Majority 
Number (Percentage) 
of Cases in which the 










judges were in 
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TABLE B17: Assignment of All Fourth Circuit Opinions Decided 
in 1988 Where Judge Wilkins Was on the Panel 
 
Appeals from Federal 
Convictions 
Cases other than 
Appeals from Federal 
Convictions Total 
Cases in which 
Judge Wilkins 
was assigned the 
opinion 6 17 23 
Cases in which 
Judge Wilkins 
was not assigned 
the opinion 8 44 52 
Total 14 61 75 
Fisher’s exact: p = 0.339. 
TABLE B18: Assignment of all First Circuit Opinions Decided in 
1988 Where Judge Breyer Was on the Panel 
 
Appeals from Federal 
Convictions 
Cases other than 
Appeals from Federal 
Convictions Total 
Cases in which 
Judge Breyer was 
assigned the 
opinion 8 29 37 
Cases in which 
Judge Breyer was 
not assigned the 
opinion 24 58 82 
Total 32 87 119 
Chi-Square = 0.76 [p = 0.384]. 
TABLE B19: Assignment of Guidelines Opinions to Judge Wilkins, 
According to Guidelines Headnote Ratio 
 Ratio ≤ 
0.3333 




Cases in which 
Judge Wilkins 
was assigned the 
opinion 8 6 16 30 
Cases in which 
Judge Wilkins 
was not assigned 
the opinion 1 2 9 12 
Total 9 8 25 42 
Fisher’s exact: p = 0.411. 
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TABLE B20: Assignment of Guidelines Opinions to Judge Breyer, 
According to Guidelines Headnote Ratio 
 
Ratio ≤ 0.3333 
0.3333 < Ratio ≤ 










the opinion 14 14 13 41 
Total 20 22 33 75 
Chi-squared = 5.7177 [p = 0.057*]. 
TABLE B21: Assignment of Bankruptcy Opinions to Former 
Bankruptcy Judges, According to Bankruptcy Headnote Ratio 
 
Ratio ≤ 0.3333 
0.3333 < Ratio ≤ 












the opinion 37 22 103 162 
Total 57 50 238 345 
Chi-squared = 8.8472 [p = 0.012**]. 
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TABLE B22: Assignment of Opinions in Federal Criminal Cases, and 
Guidelines Cases, to Judge Wilkins, Broken Down by Party of the 
President who Appointed the Assigning Judge 
 Cases Assigned by Judges 
Appointed by Democratic 
Presidents 
Cases Assigned by Judges 



























(60.00) < 0.01*** 32 
23 




(68.75) < 0.01*** 26 
19 
(73.08) < 0.01*** 0.515262 
 
  
                                                                                                                     
 261. Chi-squared test. 
 262. Fisher’s exact test. 
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TABLE B23: Assignment of Opinions to Former Bankruptcy Judges, 
Broken Down by Party of the President who Appointed the Assigning 
Judge 
 Cases Assigned by Judges Appointed 
by Democratic Presidents 
Cases Assigned by Judges Appointed 





No. (%age) of 
Cases 




























< 0.01*** 0.27263 
Batchelder 21 7 
(33.33) 
0.580 55 23 
(41.82) 
0.117 0.50264 
Cole 33 14 
(42.42) 
0.176 16 9 
(56.25) 
0.050** 0.36265 
Melloy 1 1 
(100.00) 
0.0333 20 12 
(60.00) 
0.013** 1.00266 
Porfilio 59 32 
(54.24) 
< 0.01*** 80 36 
(45.00) 
0.020** 0.28267 
Total 125 61 
(41.19) 
< 0.01*** 224 122 
(55.20) 
< 0.01*** 0.28268 
 
  
                                                                                                                     
 263. Fisher’s exact test. 
 264. Chi-squared test. 
 265. Chi-squared test. 
 266. Fisher’s exact test. 
 267. Chi-squared test. 
 268. Chi-squared test. 
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